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LEGAL ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL CLOUD 
Paul M. Schwartz * 
Increased use of the cloud and its international scope raise signifi-
cant challenges to traditional legal authorities that permit access to data 
stored outside the United States. The resulting stakes are high. This 
area of law affects a wide range of important matters concerning law 
enforcement, national security, and civil litigation.  
Up until now, however, policymakers in this area have failed to 
fully appreciate the technological distinctions between different types of 
data clouds. This Article develops and distinguishes between three mod-
els of cloud computing to provide greater clarity for courts when evalu-
ating international data access requests. These models are the Data 
Shard, Data Localization, and Data Trust clouds. This new typology 
reveals how the same legal authority will lead to notably different results 
in data access cases depending on the technical architecture of the cloud 
network. To illustrate, this Article assesses the likely results for each type 
of cloud under the full range of American legal authorities that permit 
parties to seek digital information held abroad—namely, the Fourth 
Amendment, the Stored Communications Act, Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties, administrative or grand jury subpoenas, and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
This Article’s analysis of cloud models also points to the profound 
instability of current American data access rules. The writing is on the 
wall. Companies and individuals outside of the United States now have 
multiple ways, including changing their cloud management models, to 
shelter data beyond the exclusive reach of U.S. law, which will increase 
the importance of non-U.S. access rules. This trend will spell the end 
of unilateral decisionmaking by U.S. courts concerning the legal process  
to be applied when the government or civil litigants seek data stored 
extraterritorially. 
In response, this Article advances two principles for a world of 
omnipresent global cloud computing. First, U.S. law should treat extra-
territorial data requests equally, regardless of the location of the cloud 
provider’s headquarters. This legal approach would foster a level play-
ing field for global cloud companies and encourage innovation, rather 
than further balkanization of the internet. Second, there is a need for 
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international cooperation to create reciprocity. The “Pax Americana” of 
unilateral U.S. governance in this area is ending, and the wisest course 
for U.S. policy is to establish new international agreements for global 
data access. As this Article details, the CLOUD Act of 2018 takes a 
major step toward incorporation of these principles in an effort to pre-
serve the internet as a global space. But the Act also encourages a know-
your-customer regime, where the ultimate cost may be paid in users’ 
privacy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is one of the fastest-growing areas of information 
technology. Data are moving from our personal devices, such as laptops 
and phones, and onto different configurations of remotely managed serv-
ers. These servers can be networked throughout the world. The increased 
use of the cloud and its international scope raise significant challenges to 
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traditional legal authorities that permit access to data stored outside the 
United States. 
The resulting stakes are high. This area of law concerns the legal 
process to be applied when the U.S. government or civil litigants seek the 
world’s cloud data. It affects a wide range of important matters concern-
ing law enforcement, national security, and civil litigation. U.S. law 
enforcement is worried about the risk of “going dark,” a condition in 
which it cannot obtain access to stored and transmitted information.1 
International privacy advocates are concerned that U.S. laws may permit 
excessive access to global cloud data services provided by U.S.-based com-
panies.2 Internet scholars are raising the alarm about a balkanization of 
the web due to country-by-country data localization instead of a globally 
networked internet.3 Finally, leading American tech companies are afraid 
that U.S. law will cause foreign customers to abandon their cloud services 
and products.4 
Unfortunately, policymakers in this area have long proceeded with a 
double form of tunnel vision. The ﬁrst shortcoming is that much legal 
analysis in this area is siloed; it looks at only one U.S. access authority at a 
time. Currently, much attention is devoted to the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA).5 This statute requires the government to obtain a warrant or 
court order to access speciﬁed customer data held by internet service 
providers.6 In a dramatic turn of events regarding this statute, the highly 
contested case of United States v. Microsoft Corp. reached the Supreme 
Court,7 only to be mooted when Congress swiftly enacted the CLOUD 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5–6 (2017) (statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director, 
FBI). 
 2. For a discussion, see Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data 
Privacy Law, 106 Geo. L.J. 115, 118–19 (2017) [hereinafter Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic 
Data Privacy]. 
 3. See Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The 
Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 473, 474–75 (2016) 
[hereinafter Daskal, Law Enforcement Access]; Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How 
Both the EU and the U.S. Are “Stricter” than Each Other for the Privacy of Government 
Requests for Information, 66 Emory L.J. 617, 662 (2017); Andrew Keane Woods, Against 
Data Exceptionalism, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 729, 752–53 (2016). 
 4. For different perspectives on this concern, see Clint Boulton, NSA’s Prism Could 
Cost IT Service Market $180 Billion, Wall St. J.: CIO Journal (Aug. 16, 2013), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/08/16/nsas-prism-could-cost-it-service-market-180-billion/ 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Ian Traynor, European Firms ‘Could Quit US 
Internet Providers over NSA Scandal,’ Guardian (July 4, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/jul/04/european-us-internet-providers-nsa [https://perma.cc/T9QP-BZ3R]. 
 5. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 6. See id. § 2703. 
 7. 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017), granting cert. to In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft Ireland), 829 F.3d 197 (2d 
Cir. 2016). 
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Act of 2018.8 This Act settled the question of the international reach of a 
single U.S. legal statute: It makes clear that SCA warrants have an 
extraterritorial reach. At the same time, however, the CLOUD Act 
represents a potential decisive break with the past siloed approach—at 
least regarding law enforcement access to the cloud. It opens the door to 
the establishment of new rules for government-to-government access to 
data. Once adopted, these new executive agreements will allow foreign 
governments to make direct data requests to U.S. cloud providers. This 
major turn can only be understood, however, as part of an assessment of 
the full range of extraterritorial access rules. This Article carries out this 
task. 
The second form of tunnel vision is that much legal analysis ignores 
the kind of cloud in which data are stored. This shortcoming is highly 
problematic because different types of clouds raise distinct legal issues.9 
Sound legal policy in this area depends on an awareness of the underly-
ing management model of a cloud network. All clouds are not created 
equal, especially when it comes to where and how they store information, 
and how they permit access to it.10 
This Article corrects the law’s tunnel vision about cloud computing. 
This correction leads to a weighty conclusion: The long-standing “Pax 
Americana” for data access rules is ending.11 The old system was one of 
unilateral reliance by the United States on its own rules for extraterrito-
rial access. Today, there are efficient technological end-runs available for 
the rest of the world that permit non-U.S. cloud customers to avoid U.S. 
rules for data stored outside the United States.12 This Article demon-
strates the grounds for the weakening and future collapse of the current 
Pax Americana for data access rules. 
The Article then develops two primary principles for constructing a 
new legal order for a world of omnipresent cloud computing and assesses 
the CLOUD Act in light of these policy propositions. First, the United 
States should treat extraterritorial clouds equally, regardless of the 
nationality of the corporate provider.13 Any other approach would hasten 
internet balkanization and encourage non-U.S. customers to favor cloud 
providers that are not headquartered in the United States. Such a devel-
opment would be counterproductive; it would reduce access to global 
clouds by U.S. law enforcement, national security agencies, and civil liti-
gants. Second, U.S. access rules should be supplemented by development 
                                                                                                                           
 8. CLOUD Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. div. V (2018). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. On the past reliance on U.S. decisionmaking for internet governance, which this 
Article calls “Pax Americana” for the internet, see Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who 
Controls the Internet? 13–46 (2006). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra section III.B.1. 
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of new international agreements concerning extraterritorial data access.14 
These agreements should ﬁrst be negotiated with individual nations 
whose legal rules concerning access to cloud information are closest to 
those of the United States. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. It ﬁrst explores the siloed and 
fragmented nature of current legal analysis in this area. It does so 
through analysis of two cases concerning the global reach of warrants 
under the SCA. The pedagogical value of these cases remains undimin-
ished by the CLOUD Act. The ﬁrst case, In re Warrant to Search a Certain 
E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft 
Ireland), is the Second Circuit decision that upheld territorial limits to 
SCA warrants but was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court.15 The 
second case, In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google (Google 
Pennsylvania), came to a result contrary to the circuit decision of Microsoft 
Ireland.16 Google Pennsylvania is one of a series of important judicial deci-
sions reaching the same conclusion for clouds run by Google; these judg-
ments found that the SCA extends to extraterritorial clouds.17 While 
Microsoft Ireland and Google Pennsylvania have polar opposite outcomes, 
they reﬂect the same basic limitation: Both cases are based on a ﬂawed 
understanding of the critical technology before the courts. Microsoft 
Ireland and Google Pennsylvania concern different underlying cloud mod-
els, which raise distinct legal and policy issues. Yet, these cases and the 
leading scholarship concerning global access to networked data fail to 
engage with important distinctions among cloud technologies.18 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See infra section III.B.2. 
 15. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018) (per curiam) 
(vacating and remanding Microsoft Ireland with instructions to dismiss as moot). For the 
path to the Supreme Court for this case, see Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), 
reh’g denied, 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017); see also In re Info. Associated with One Yahoo 
Email Address that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Yahoo, Nos. 17-M-1234, 17-M-1235, 
2017 WL 706307, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017) (adopting the reasoning of the four 
judges who dissented from the Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, such that it 
would be a permissible domestic application of the SCA to enforce the warrants at issue). 
 16. See 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 719–25 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that warrants issued 
pursuant to the SCA seeking data stored abroad did not violate the presumption against 
extraterritoriality because any invasion of privacy would occur at the time of the disclosure 
in the United States). 
 17. Other cases analyzing the Google cloud have reached the same result as Google 
Pennsylvania. See, e.g., In re Two Email Accounts Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 
2017 WL 2838156, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search of Info. Associated with 
[Redacted]@gmail.com that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-
757 (GMH), 2017 WL 2480752, at *11 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re Search of Content that 
Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, No. 16-mc-80263-LB, 2017 WL 1487625, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017). 
 18. The relevant scholarship engages around issues concerning the future meaning 
of territoriality for cloud data. Compare Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 
125 Yale L.J. 326, 365–78 (2015) [hereinafter Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data] 
(arguing that global telecommunications make territoriality a meaningless concept for 
deciding data access questions for cloud information), with Woods, supra note 3, at 735 
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This Article argues for a new approach. Legal decisionmaking about 
access to global clouds must be grounded in knowledge of how existing 
clouds differ from one another. Initially, cloud services were U.S.-centric: 
U.S.-headquartered companies provided cloud services on a global basis 
but stored data on servers in the United States.19 U.S. companies quickly 
moved beyond this U.S.-centric approach, however, and developed glob-
ally distributed cloud networks.20 In reﬂection of this reality, this Article 
develops a new taxonomy of cloud services. Deﬁned from the perspective 
of a U.S.-headquartered company, the three essential models are Data 
Shard, Data Localization, and Data Trust clouds.21 
                                                                                                                           
(“Contrary to prevailing wisdom, jurisdiction over cloud-based data has nearly everything 
to do with territoriality—it requires an inquiry into the location of the data, the domicile 
of the data controller, the location of the crime, the citizenship of the victim, and/or the 
citizenship of the perpetrator.”). For other scholarship that examines the issue of 
territoriality in the internet age and other issues related to global data access, see generally 
Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the 
Cloud, 73 Md. L. Rev. 313, 351–83 (2013) (explaining why the internet model for personal 
jurisdiction and choice of law does not perfectly address the unique jurisdictional issues 
posed by cloud computing and advancing workable approaches); David Cole & Federico 
Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United States, the European Union, and 
the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 14 Int’l J. Const. L. 220, 233–37 (2016) 
(advocating for a transatlantic privacy agreement between the United States and the 
European Union to safeguard citizens’ privacy against overinvasive surveillance across 
borders); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 
285, 285–86 (2015) [hereinafter Kerr, The Fourth Amendment] (noting the territorial 
nature of Fourth Amendment application and the goal of “adapt[ing] existing principles 
for the transition from a domestic, physical environment to a global, networked world”); 
Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373, 
374 (2014) [hereinafter Kerr, Next Generation] (proposing the contours of a “next 
generation privacy act” in the United States to better address modern low storage costs 
and delocalized networks); Ned Schultheis, Warrants in the Clouds: How Extraterritorial 
Application of the Stored Communications Act Threatens the United States’ Cloud 
Storage Industry, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 661, 682–87 (2015) (describing tensions 
between the European Union, its Member States, and the United States regarding the 
extraterritorial use of SCA warrants and the need for a system more streamlined than the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process); Recent Case, In re Warrant to Search a 
Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1019, 1026 (2015) (arguing that in the context of SCA 
warrants, “the location that matters is that of the service provider and not the requested 
data”). 
 19. Anthony T. Velte et al., Cloud Computing 117 (2010). 
 20. See Arne Josefsberg, Dublin Data Center Celebrates Grand Opening, Microsoft: 
TechNet (Sept. 23, 2009), https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msdatacenters/2009/09/ 
23/dublin-data-center-celebrates-grand-opening [https://perma.cc/2ZQL-6EJW] (de-
scribing the grand opening of Microsoft’s first international cloud center in Dublin, 
Ireland, in 2009); AWS Global Infrastructure, Amazon Web Services, https://aws.amazon.com/ 
about-aws/global-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/QV77-MZT4] (last visited July 26, 
2018) (noting that the first U.S. location of Amazon Web Services launched in 2006 with 
locations following in Ireland in 2007 and Singapore in 2010). 
 21. See infra section I.B. 
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To shift the grounds for legal analysis and policy debate, this Article 
identiﬁes these three models of cloud computing and explores how 
different judicial results follow once the law understands their implica-
tions. A Data Shard cloud is one in which information is “sharded”; it 
splits data up in a globally dispersed network and keeps them in constant 
motion among different data centers.22 A Data Localization cloud stores 
data outside the United States. It is also typically marketed to customers 
outside the United States. This approach permits customers to isolate 
data outside the geographical boundaries of the United States.23 Finally, a 
Data Trust cloud is one in which a non-U.S. entity manages the cloud as a 
trustee for a U.S.-headquartered provider.24 Through encryption and the 
law of trusts, the trustee effectively brings such cloud data under its 
domestic, non-U.S. law. 
In Part II, this Article goes beyond the SCA to explore the full range 
of American legal authorities that permit parties to seek digital infor-
mation held abroad. Looking at requests by government authorities and 
private parties, the Article assesses the likely results when information is 
held in Data Shard, Data Localization, or Data Trust clouds. Using this 
taxonomy, Part II identiﬁes notable and meaningful differences in likely 
outcomes when the legal authority is the same, but different cloud man-
agement models are involved. This analysis notably pinpoints the grounds 
for the profound instability of the current U.S. approach. The writing is 
on the wall; the rest of the world can and will increasingly “route around” 
U.S. legal access rules by shifting to clouds that increase the importance 
of non-U.S. law. This trend will spell the end of unilateral decisionmaking 
by U.S. courts concerning the legal process to be applied when the 
government or civil litigants seek data stored extraterritorially. 
Finally, in its third Part, this Article presents two principles for a new 
U.S. approach. As a ﬁrst principle, this Article argues that U.S. law should 
treat extraterritorial data requests equally, regardless of the location of 
the cloud provider’s headquarters.25 One beneﬁt of this approach is that 
it would avoid putting U.S.-based companies in a position in which they 
have to choose between obeying one but not both sets of legal demands. 
One legal system may forbid a transfer of data, and the United States may 
require it. In short, U.S. companies can face conﬂicting obligations with 
regard to a single item of data.26 U.S. law should not create stricter legal 
standards for the extraterritorial customer data of U.S.-based cloud com-
panies. A legal approach that fosters a level playing ﬁeld for global cloud 
                                                                                                                           
 22. See infra section I.B. 
 23. See infra section I.B. 
 24. See infra section I.B. 
 25. See infra section III.B.1. 
 26. For a discussion of this conflict, see Volkswagen, A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 
902 (Tex. 1995) (“[W]hen the laws of the foreign sovereign protect relevant information 
from discovery, the interests of the domestic court or agency must be balanced with those 
of the foreign sovereign.”). 
1688 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:1681 
 
companies would reward the development of technical expertise, permit 
the market to select the superior cloud technology, promote the scala-
bility of technology, and help prevent the balkanization of the internet 
into competing national or regional ﬁefdoms. The CLOUD Act makes a 
decisive move in this direction for the SCA, although much depends on 
how courts will apply the required comity analysis. 
The second principle concerns the need for international coopera-
tion around the concept of reciprocity.27 The United States should 
develop a series of international agreements on access to global cloud 
data; the ﬁrst step should be negotiations with countries that most closely 
share American values. In a path-breaking step for cooperation in 
international law enforcement, the CLOUD Act goes far beyond its 
amendments of the SCA. This law also supplements the current land-
scape of legal access rules by opening the door for the United States to 
negotiate separate executive agreements with other nations. The United 
States and United Kingdom are now developing such a bilateral agree-
ment.28 Much is open, however, regarding this new statute’s impact on 
global privacy, law enforcement access to cloud data, and a global and 
interoperable internet. One looming problem is the likely collision 
between the CLOUD Act and the data protection laws of the European 
Union, in particular the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which took effect in May 2018. A further conﬂict will follow from the 
European Union’s preference for a coordinated E.U.–U.S. response con-
cerning international data access, as opposed to the CLOUD Act’s 
approach of authorizing bilateral accords with individual countries. 
A ﬁnal aspect of the law’s regulation of the cloud is worth noting: 
the shift underway to a know-your-customer global regime for the inter-
net. The CLOUD Act creates incentives for providers to be aware of and 
be able to document the nationality and location of their users. The 
beneﬁt to the provider will be to make the location of their servers less 
important. In so doing, this law reduces the signiﬁcance of data localiza-
tion for data access requests and thereby promotes the maintenance of a 
globally interoperable internet. But in encouraging this documentation 
of the nationality and location of cloud customers, the CLOUD Act 
moves providers closer to the paradigm in place for U.S. banks and ﬁnan-
cial service entities, which collect detailed identiﬁcation information 
about customers and are even legally required to ﬁle reports proactively 
when their customers engage in suspicious activities.29 
                                                                                                                           
 27. See infra section III.B.2. 
 28. International Conflicts of Law and Their Implications for Cross Border Data 
Requests by Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 
2–3 (2016) [hereinafter Statement of Rep. Goodlatte] (statement of Rep. Goodlatte, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 29. See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2017) (requiring banks and other financial institutions 
to maintain Customer Identification Programs). 
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I. MODELS OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) deﬁnes 
cloud computing as “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand net-
work access to a shared pool of conﬁgurable computing resources . . . 
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
effort or service provider interaction.”30 To expand on this concise deﬁni-
tion, one would begin by noting how the cloud locates computing 
resources on the internet to make them dynamic and scalable.31 Such 
distributed computing permits rapid expansion of data processing to 
handle a greater load or take on new tasks.32 Cloud computing also trans-
fers computing responsibilities from one party to another and achieves 
new efficiencies in computing management.33 Today, the cloud is ubiqui-
tous. A Pew Foundation poll already predicts a future in which all of us 
access software and share information through cloud servers rather than 
personal computers.34 
Beyond this description, courts in extraterritorial access cases tend 
to look at other aspects of the cloud. In particular, these courts have 
focused on where cloud data are stored, and how and where companies 
access them. These cases, however, typically examine only a single 
management model at a time and in incomplete fashion, which has 
helped to obscure the important variations that exist among cloud 
networks. 
Building on case law and drawing on marketplace developments in 
global data storage services, this Part develops a three-part model of 
cloud management. It ﬁrst demonstrates the need for this model by con-
trasting two recent cases, Microsoft Ireland and Google Pennsylvania. In 
these cases, U.S. law enforcement sought information stored in global 
clouds. The information demands were made pursuant to the same stat-
ute, the SCA, but the two courts reached divergent outcomes. Post–
CLOUD Act, these cases remain highly useful as a pedagogical matter. 
First, these cases reveal how U.S. courts ignore technical differences 
among different kinds of extraterritorial clouds. These technical differ-
ences continue to exist after enactment of the CLOUD Act and they 
remain highly signiﬁcant for the kinds of comity analyses that this new 
statute requires for certain law enforcement requests for extraterritorial 
                                                                                                                           
 30. NIST Cloud Computing Program—NCCP, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., 
https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/cloud-computing [https://perma.cc/P52N-NGQ3] 
(last updated Apr. 12, 2018). 
 31. For an introduction, see Velte et al., supra note 19, at 3–4. 
 32. See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1623, 
1628–32 (2013) (describing the recent “shift in global data access and processing” 
attending the growth of cloud computing). 
 33. See id. at 1632–34; see also Velte et al., supra note 19, at 77–78. 
 34. See Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, Pew Research Ctr., The Future of Cloud 
Computing 8 (June 11, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/06/11/the-future-of-
cloud-computing [https://perma.cc/9GEM-6Z29]. 
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data. Second, the technical differences in types of clouds remain 
important for the many legal authorities beyond the SCA. Hence, 
Microsoft Ireland and Google Pennsylvania allow the exploration of legal 
and technical issues that the enactment of the CLOUD Act leaves 
unresolved. 
This Part then sets out its three cloud models: the Data Shard, Data 
Localization, and Data Trust clouds. It analyzes how they differ from each 
other regarding the issues of location of cloud data and access to the infor-
mation. Finally, this Part examines the lack of consensus in leading 
scholarship regarding the meaning and importance of territoriality in 
cases involving access to networked data. 
In light of these three models, this Article builds upon this scholar-
ship to derive a set of four initial lessons. First, the legal signiﬁcance of 
where cloud data is accessed versus where it is located—the source of 
much scholarly debate—cannot be answered without reference to spe-
ciﬁc cloud models. Beyond Microsoft Ireland and Google Pennsylvania, how-
ever, it is striking how other courts have futilely tried to resolve questions 
of extraterritorial access to cloud data equipped only with the concepts 
of access and location. Second, the Data Trust cloud shows how it is possi-
ble to divide management of networked information from the ability to 
access it. This difference has important implications for certain kinds of 
U.S. access requests. Third, internet balkanization is already occurring and 
is a trend that has continued post–CLOUD Act. Fourth, cloud technology 
allows parties outside of the United States to shelter their data in distinct 
ways, which calls for policymakers to consider the full range of legal 
authorities and the interaction of law and cloud technology. 
A. Case Law: Microsoft Ireland and Google Pennsylvania 
Federal electronic surveillance law for domestic law enforcement 
consists of three statutes: the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications 
Act, and the Pen Register Act.35 Of these, the SCA is the most relevant to 
access to cloud information.36 There are many open questions regarding 
this statute’s applicability to information stored in a cloud located outside 
the United States. To begin exploring these uncertainties, this Article con-
siders two recent decisions. 
In Microsoft Ireland, the Second Circuit held that the SCA did not 
obligate Microsoft to give the government information stored in an extra-
territorial data center.37 After accepting the government’s appeal from 
this decision, the Supreme Court ultimately declared it mooted by the 
enactment of the CLOUD Act, which, given its extraterritorial reach, 
                                                                                                                           
 35. For an overview, see Daniel Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy Law 
344–53 (6th ed. 2017) [hereinafter Solove & Schwartz, Information Privacy Law]. 
 36. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 37. See 829 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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would have obligated Microsoft to give the government that information.38 
Unlike the Second Circuit in Microsoft Ireland, the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in Google Pennsylvania held that the SCA required a cloud 
provider to supply the government with information distributed in its 
global network.39  
Two cases, two results. There is far more here, however, than this ini-
tial snapshot indicates. Beyond the narrow question regarding the extrater-
ritorial reach of the SCA, which the CLOUD Act resolved, there are 
signiﬁcant underlying dissimilarities between the clouds involved in these 
two cases, and those dissimilarities warrant distinct legal consideration. 
All clouds are not created equal, and technical differences among 
them raise legal issues that will persist for future discovery requests post–
CLOUD Act, both for the CLOUD Act itself and for other legal authori-
ties beyond that statute. Before examining these differences, it will be 
valuable to understand two further aspects of cloud computing. First, the 
cloud represents an extremely lucrative area for U.S. companies to offer 
services, and second, it raises major concerns for U.S. security agencies 
and law enforcement agencies. Regarding the importance of this area for 
business, a multibillion-dollar market exists for the international clouds 
of U.S. companies. In addition, U.S. law regarding access to personal 
data strongly affects this market. There has also been a relevant water-
shed moment in this regard. June 2013 marked the beginning of the 
revelations from former National Security Agency (NSA) employee 
Edward Snowden about NSA surveillance and the secret cooperation of 
many U.S. companies with the government’s clandestine activities.40 In 
response, many customers of cloud services outside the United States 
developed newfound interest in using clouds that avoided the territory of 
the United States. Post-Snowden, Forrester Research estimated that U.S. 
businesses lost up to $180 billion due to the distrust in some countries 
toward U.S. tech companies.41 
In a similarly high-proﬁle fashion, national security agencies and law 
enforcement in the United States consider this area of law to be one of 
paramount significance. The storage of information in bits and pieces in 
cloud networks has the potential to limit their ability to access cloud data, 
                                                                                                                           
 38. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2018) (per curiam) 
(vacating and remanding Microsoft Ireland with instructions to dismiss as moot). 
 39. See 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 709 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 40. For a discussion by the European Court of Justice of the Snowden leaks, see Case 
C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 650. For the Guardian’s archive 
relating to the leaked NSA files, see James Ball et. al, Revealed: How US and UK Spy 
Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, Guardian (Sept. 6, 2013), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security [https:// 
perma.cc/7535-49VM]; Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, Guardian 
(Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-
nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1 [https://perma.cc/9S8E-3WGK]. 
 41. Boulton, supra note 4. 
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posing a possible catch-22. As Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter 
observed in Google Pennsylvania regarding the kind of cloud at issue in 
that case: “[N]o one knows which country to ask, and even if speciﬁc 
servers could be identiﬁed, the data may no longer be there by the time 
its location has been identiﬁed.”42 In a sense, this issue is a variation of 
the going dark problem raised by national security and law enforcement 
agencies in the debate about strong encryption and “back doors.” New 
devices, including iPhones, increasingly rely on encryption, which makes 
the data unreadable and can preempt these agencies from accessing 
communications they otherwise have the legal authority to access.43 
Similarly, cloud data stored extraterritorially may evade the ability of 
governmental officials to use legal authorities to view targeted 
communications. From their viewpoint, the network has “gone dark.” 
At this point, a discussion of the hidden dissimilarities between Google 
Pennsylvania and Microsoft Ireland is necessary. In particular, these cases 
illuminate how different models of cloud management can encourage 
different conclusions regarding the scope of the same legal authority. 
The lesson is one that extends beyond the SCA and the CLOUD Act. In 
Google Pennsylvania, Magistrate Judge Rueter held that a warrant com-
pelling Google to disclose information was not an extraterritorial appli-
cation of the SCA.44 His analysis of the question of extraterritoriality 
turned on where the access to the information would take place.45 Google 
argued that the warrants at issue could not compel it to produce records 
that were stored outside the United States.46 Functionally, however, 
Google could only access the extraterritorially stored information 
through its Legal Investigations Support Team in the United States.47 
Google would then turn the information over to the FBI pursuant to its 
warrant request, and the agency would review the copies of the data in 
Pennsylvania.48 Under the facts of the case, therefore, the judge found 
                                                                                                                           
 42. 232 F. Supp. 3d at 725. 
 43. See In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During Execution of a Search 
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 
WL 618401, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (noting the government’s difficulty in accessing 
data on an iPhone due to the device’s encryption). However, the FBI has come under fire 
for “grossly inflat[ing]” statistics it cited as the most compelling evidence for the need to 
address going dark: It “claim[ed] investigators were locked out of nearly 7,800 devices 
connected to crimes last year when the correct number was much smaller, probably between 
1,000 and 2,000.” Devlin Barrett, FBI Repeatedly Overstated Encryption Threat Figures 
to Congress, Public, Wash. Post (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/fbi-repeatedly-overstated-encryption-threat-figures-to-congress-public/ 
2018/05/22/5b68ae90-5dce-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html [https://perma.cc/EY7J-
AWAB]. 
 44. See 232 F. Supp. 3d at 725. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 710. 
 47. Id. at 712–13. 
 48. Id. at 722. 
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that access depended on the location of the search and the review. He 
determined that “the searches of the electronic data . . . will occur in 
the United States when the FBI reviews the copies of the requested 
data in Pennsylvania.”49 Magistrate Judge Rueter focused on (1) where 
the data would be retrieved by the cloud provider pursuant to a warrant, 
and (2) where the data would be given to U.S. law enforcement.50 The 
answer to both questions was the same: These activities would take place 
within the United States. 
Conversely, in Microsoft Ireland, the Second Circuit focused on the 
location of the sought-after data and held that the SCA did not require 
Microsoft to give the government information stored in its non-U.S. data 
center.51 Writing for the court, Judge Susan L. Carney emphasized that 
“even messages stored in the ‘cloud’ have a discernible physical loca-
tion,”52 and in Microsoft’s case, the relevant information was located at its 
data center in Dublin, Ireland.53 In its interpretation of the underlying 
statute, the appellate court ruled that Congress did not intend for SCA 
warrants to have a global reach.54 The matter might not have been clear 
when the SCA was enacted in 1986, but in enacting the CLOUD Act in 
2018, Congress made explicit its wish for these warrants to have such an 
exterritorial reach.55 
These cases used different tests: One looked to the issue of data 
access, the other to data location. The cases cannot be understood, how-
ever, without attention to the different underlying cloud management 
models. Google Pennsylvania involved a Data Shard cloud, a type of cloud 
in which the cloud provider stores information both globally and domes-
tically.56 It breaks data into small components, or shards, which the sys-
tem routes around the globe, with different bits shifted between various 
locations.57 In contrast, Microsoft Ireland involved a Data Localization 
cloud, a type of cloud in which information is stored extraterritorially.58 
As noted above and discussed further below, a pure Data Localization 
cloud is one in which the information can be accessed only in the same 
geographic location as where the data are stored.59 Yet, the Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 721–22. 
 51. See 829 F.3d 197, 216 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 52. Id. at 220 n.28. 
 53. Id. at 209, 220 n.28. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See CLOUD Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. div. V, § 102(1)–(2) (2018). 
 56. See 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 723 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See 829 F.3d at 220. 
 59. There is a twist in Microsoft Ireland, which is that the precise model at stake was a 
partial or incomplete one. See id. at 230 (Lynch, J., concurring) (noting that Microsoft 
stores emails on local servers in Ireland, but that it can also access them from Redmond, 
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in Microsoft Ireland did not consider whether pure Data Localization would 
raise different issues, or whether and how to assess the partial localization 
in that case. 
A ﬁnal distinction exists between these two cases. It concerns the 
practical consequences of a ﬁnding of “no access” under the SCA—as 
constituted pre–CLOUD Act—in Microsoft Ireland (the Data Localization 
cloud), or Google Pennsylvania (the Data Shard cloud). In Microsoft 
Ireland, the U.S. government had an important alternative beyond the 
SCA to access the sought-after information: It could draw on the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process.60 As this Article discusses 
below,61 under an MLAT, a public authority can ask for the assistance of 
the country in which the sought-after data are held, and the request will 
be processed in the foreign country consistent with the domestic law of 
that country.62 In Google Pennsylvania, however, Magistrate Judge Rueter 
was concerned about the absence of any such mechanism.63 In his opin-
ion, Data Shard clouds emerged as a new dimension of the going dark 
problem.64 As discussed below, the CLOUD Act now provides built-in 
mechanisms, through its comity provisions, that the SCA did not origi-
nally allow and that might mitigate some of the need for MLATs.65 None-
theless, and as also discussed below, MLATs are likely to remain important. 
B. Data Shards, Data Localization, and Data Trusts 
As discussed above, different technical models for cloud computing 
are present in the Google Pennsylvania and Microsoft Ireland cases. Building 
on these two examples and others, this Article now develops a taxonomy 
of cloud types. Drawing on existing deployment patterns, it identifies three 
approaches to cloud management: the Data Shard, Data Localization, and 
Data Trust models. Each of these technical approaches—which are not 
typically distinguished under current legal analysis—has distinct implica-
tions for how the law should govern access to international cloud data. 
                                                                                                                           
Washington). This Article explores the issue of storage of data versus where the data can 
be accessed below. See infra section I.C. 
 60. See Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d at 221. 
 61. See infra section II.A.3. 
 62. See generally Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an 
Era of Globalized Communications, 71 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 687 (2016) [hereinafter 
Swire & Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance] (presenting an excellent overview of the 
MLAT process); World Map, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, https://mlat.info 
[https://perma.cc/R36T-QK74] (last visited July 26, 2018) (providing a graphical 
representation of, and further details on, the extensive global network of MLATs). 
 63. See 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 724 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 64. See id. at 724–25. 
 65. See infra section III.B. 
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In the Data Shard cloud, a company stores information in the cloud 
in multiple international locations.66 In this dynamic approach, the net-
work itself distributes data to domestic and international servers. A single 
ﬁle can be broken into components and stored in different countries, 
and intelligence embedded in the network decides where to send and 
store the data. The network harnesses its own intelligence to create opera-
tional efficiencies.67 As Anupam Chander and Uyên P. Lê observe, “rows 
of a database are held separately in servers across the world—making 
each partition a ‘shard’ that provides enough data for operation.”68 
Because data are inherently scattered under this approach, national 
boundaries are largely irrelevant. The data are sharded according to the 
logic of the system, and not according to venerable historical lines drawn 
on a map of the world.69 Like Richard Wagner’s Flying Dutchman, the 
information located in a Data Shard cloud is constantly in motion. Its 
only rest occurs when summoned by a company’s legal team. 
The Google cloud provides a leading example of the Data Shard 
approach. As the court in Google Pennsylvania noted, Google operates a 
cloud network that “automatically moves data from one location on 
Google’s network to another . . . to optimize for performance, reliability, 
and other efficiencies.”70 More speciﬁcally, the Google Pennsylvania court 
observed that “Google user data . . . is not stored as one single, cohesive 
digital ﬁle; instead, Google stores individual data ﬁles in multiple data 
‘shards,’ each separate shard being stored in separate locations around 
the world.”71 A user’s information might be found in the United States as 
well as on Google servers throughout the world.72 Moreover, under its 
Data Shard model, Google can only access information in its cloud from 
the United States.73 Hence, it locates cloud information in shifting loca-
tions throughout the world but accesses cloud information exclusively 
from the United States.74 
                                                                                                                           
 66. For a discussion of data sharding, see generally Sikha Bagui & Loi Tang Nguyen, 
Database Sharding: To Provide Fault Tolerance and Scalability of Big Data on the Cloud, 5 
Int’l J. Cloud Applications & Computing 36 (2015); Patrick Ryan & Sarah Falvey, Trust in 
the Clouds, 28 Computer L. & Security Rev. 513, 520 (2012). 
 67. Cory Isaacson, Database Sharding: The Key to Database Scalability, Database 
Trends and Applications (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.dbta.com/Editorial/Trends-
and-Applications/Database-Sharding–The-Key-to-Database-Scalability-55615.aspx [http:// 
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 68. Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 Emory L.J. 677, 719 
(2015). 
 69. Ryan & Falvey, supra note 66, at 520. 
 70. 232 F. Supp. 3d 708, 723 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 71. Id. at 724. 
 72. Id. at 712–13. 
 73. Id. 
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In Data Localization, the second model, a company stores infor-
mation in a cloud that is restricted to a single country or region.75 A 
number of U.S. cloud providers, including Amazon Web Services (AWS) 
and Microsoft, take this approach. For example, AWS now has ﬁfty-ﬁve 
“availability zones” around the world.76 It most recently opened a 
European region in France.77 German telecommunication companies have 
also developed clouds that store data exclusively in Germany.78 As one 
trade publication explains, “The main selling points for cloud operators 
in Germany are location, location[,] and location.”79 An important 
distinction should be made, however, between data localization as a tech-
nical matter and as a legal one. This Article uses the concept of the Data 
Localization model to point to technical localization, that is, a network con-
ﬁguration that stores digital information exclusively in one or more loca-
tions and excludes it from other geographic locations. In contrast, legal 
localization refers to a statute or other binding legal mandate that 
requires such local data storage. Chander and Lê have documented a 
notable trend throughout the world of legal data localization.80 
A Data Localization model was at the center of the Microsoft Ireland 
litigation.81 The case concerned a web-based email service run from a 
data center in Dublin, Ireland. A wholly owned Microsoft subsidiary oper-
ated this Irish data center, and U.S. law enforcement authorities had sub-
poenaed Microsoft for records in this cloud space.82 Thus far, this Article 
has discussed only the idea of a pure Data Localization model. The twist 
in the Microsoft Ireland case, however, is that the precise model at stake 
was a partial or incomplete one.83 In that case, Microsoft technicians and 
attorneys in both Dublin and Redmond, Washington, could access the 
sought-after information.84 In Microsoft Ireland, the location of the data was 
                                                                                                                           
 75. For a critical account of the “push for data localization,” see Patrick Ryan et al., 
When the Cloud Goes Local: The Global Problem with Data Localization, Computer, Dec. 
2013, at 54, 57. 
 76. AWS Global Infrastructure, supra note 20. 
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 80. See Chander & Lê, supra note 68, at 708–13. For an argument that laws requiring 
local data localization are driven by “[n]ation-states who perceive themselves to be at a 
comparative disadvantage in the efficiency of their Internet signals intelligence,” see John 
Selby, Data Localization Laws: Trade Barriers or Legitimate Responses to Cybersecurity 
Risks, or Both?, 25 Int’l J.L. & Info. Tech. 213, 232 (2017). 
 81. See 829 F.3d 197, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 82. Id. at 203. 
 83. See id. 
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employees located domestically were capable of reviewing the records in question “and 
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Ireland, but access to the information could take place either from 
Dublin or Redmond.85 Unlike the cloud model at issue in Microsoft 
Ireland, many other Data Localization clouds are complete. For example, 
cloud services offered by AWS and Microsoft’s regional European Union 
cloud are not accessible from the United States.86 
Finally, the Data Trust model, the third approach, builds on and fur-
ther reﬁnes the Data Localization approach.87 As in the Data Localization 
model, a Data Trust cloud can be located within one country or a single 
region. But the further step here is to separate network management 
from the ability to access data.88 In the Data Trust approach, one entity—
the Data Manager—oversees the network hardware and software. A sepa-
rate party, the Data Trustee, has the exclusive ability to access the data. 
Here, we reach the opposite pole from the Data Shard model, which 
relies on networked intelligence and ignores national boundaries. The 
Data Trust model depends on legal and technical constructs—national 
boundaries and trust instruments—and shapes technology to ﬁt the 
selected legal categories. This approach can be used to establish both an 
extraterritorial location of information and an extraterritorial access to it. 
Moreover, the Data Trust model bifurcates the issue of management of 
the cloud network from that of access to data. This Article terms this 
quality the “divisibility of control” and explores its signiﬁcance below. 
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 86. See Amazon Web Services, Choosing a Cloud Platform, AWS, https:// 
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July 26, 2018); Microsoft, Microsoft Azure Germany, Microsoft Azure, https:// 
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At present, only Microsoft makes use of the Data Trust model.89 It 
offers a “Microsoft Cloud Germany” to customers in the European Union 
and European Economic Area.90 The Microsoft Data Trust stores customer 
data exclusively within Germany, in data centers located in Frankfurt and 
Magdeburg.91 Most significantly, T-Systems is the trustee for the stored 
information, which means it alone controls the ability to access the 
network.92 T-Systems is an independent German corporation. The trust 
arrangement, which is a contractual obligation under German law 
between the two parties, signiﬁcantly restricts the access of Microsoft 
Germany to the information in its cloud.93 Beyond law, moreover, cus-
tomer data in the Microsoft German cloud are encrypted, and only T-
Systems holds the keys to the data.94 As a result, Microsoft is unable, as a 
technical matter, to gain access to the data in clear text. 
As the trust is set up, T-Systems—not Microsoft Germany—is 
responsible for handling all outside data requests, whether from govern-
ment or private third parties.95 As a legal matter, under the German law 
of trusts and pursuant to its agreement with T-Systems, Microsoft is 
generally forbidden from accessing the information in its cloud without 
the permission of T-Systems.96 Moreover, Microsoft can access the infor-
mation only for a limited number of speciﬁed reasons, such as for net-
work maintenance, and can do so only under the supervision of T-
                                                                                                                           
 89. See Microsoft, Microsoft Cloud Germany Datasheet 1–2 (2016) [hereinafter 
Microsoft Cloud Germany Datasheet], https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=839380& 
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Systems.97 The agreement between T-Systems and customers of the German 
cloud contractually obliges the Data Trustee, T-Systems, to perform its role 
of managing data in strict accordance with terms of the trust.98 Finally, as 
noted earlier, the data in the system are encrypted with the Data Trustee 
in control of the keys. It is the Data Trustee who performs or supervises 
any operational tasks that require access to customer data or the 
infrastructure on which customer data resides.99 
Thus, Microsoft Cloud Germany takes decisive steps to separate con-
struction and management of the cloud data from control of access to it. 
Microsoft is doubly restricted—legally and technically—from accessing 
customer data by German law (the trust arrangement) and existing tech-
nical restrictions (the encryption keys). Microsoft built the network and its 
software runs on it, but T-Systems controls the physical and “logical” 
systems that process customer data. The technology of this network solidi-
fies the divisibility of control also established by the trust agreement. 
C. The Scholarly Debate and Initial Lessons 
These three models show a rich variety of approaches to cloud 
computing services. They demonstrate that one size doesn’t ﬁt all in litiga-
tion that evaluates access to data and location of data in the cloud. Differ-
ent clouds lead to different answers to questions about ability to access 
data and the location of data. Leading legal scholarship is wrestling with 
the meaning of territoriality in regulating access to cloud data but has 
not engaged in the consideration of different types of cloud services. 
1. The Scholarly Debate. — Just as the case law is uncertain about ques-
tions regarding access and location, an important debate in the legal 
academy concerns the extent to which clouds necessitate a new approach 
in this area. The leading voices in this discussion are Professors Andrew 
Woods and Jennifer Daskal. The scholarship is divided on the question of 
the relevance of territoriality with respect to international access to cloud 
data. Woods can be seen as representing the “business as usual” camp, 
and Daskal can be viewed as leading the “data exceptionalists.”100 As we 
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will also see in the next section, members of the judiciary have adopted 
positions reﬂecting one or the other point of view. 
On one side in the debate, Woods views data as a physical object. As 
he puts it: “[T]he ‘cloud’ is actually a network of storage drives bolted to 
a particular territory . . . .”101 Regarding law enforcement access to data in 
the criminal law context, Woods notes that “[c]ontrary to prevailing wis-
dom, jurisdiction over cloud-based data has nearly everything to do with 
territoriality—it requires an inquiry into the location of the data, the 
domicile of the data controller, the location of the crime, the citizenship 
of the victim, and/or the citizenship of the perpetrator.”102 In his view, 
some scholars in this area mistakenly begin from a starting point of data 
exceptionalism.103 For Woods, academics with this perspective consider 
information to be radically different. In particular, the data exceptional-
ists believe existing legal paradigms fail to provide a framework for access 
to cloud-based data.104 
This perspective is unconvincing for Woods, who points to other 
assets, such as money in a bank account, that are similarly mobile and 
divisible.105 International wire transfers of money are a daily event and, 
crucially, in his view, courts have developed rules for “determining the 
location of money for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction over the 
asset.”106 Indeed, Woods would go so far as to argue that while cloud data 
can be “cop[ied] and store[d] in multiple locations” more easily than 
“debt, money, or other assets,” the “core of the territoriality analysis” 
remains unchanged.107 Unlike a variety of intangible assets, cloud data 
have a physical presence; they reside on “physical drives that can be 
seized.”108 
Woods proposes that a standard comity test be applied to data in the 
global cloud. Comity is a long-standing concept of reciprocity in interna-
tional law; it is the principle that one jurisdiction will extend the courtesy 
to a foreign jurisdiction by recognizing the validity of its law. In this con-
text, a comity analysis considers whether the nation seeking the infor-
mation stored in the cloud “has an interest in [the] data that outweighs 
competing state interests.”109 In the established approach, courts decide 
whether or not another jurisdiction’s interests weigh against the transfer 
of the sought-after evidence.110 Although such a test can be unpredict-
able, Woods ﬁnds any possible uncertainty to be “a small price to pay for 
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an approach to resolving conﬂicts that takes into account the concerns of 
other states and solves jurisdictional disputes in a decentralized, case-by-
case manner.”111 Woods does not explain, however, if decentralization is 
merely the best likely solution, a second-best solution, or a solution with 
merits of its own in this context. 
In addition, Woods sees a need for reciprocity among foreign legal 
authorities in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.112 In particu-
lar, he notes that “American courts could agree to respond to foreign law 
enforcement requests for data on an expedited basis if and only if the 
request comes from a country that processes American government 
requests for data expeditiously.”113 Like his judicial comity analysis, the 
policy solution here would also be decentralized. 
Finally, Woods argues that such “a decentralized, state-by-state 
approach to state access to data in the cloud” is preferable to a “push for 
an international treaty forged out of pixie dust.”114 As the mention of 
“pixie dust” indicates, Woods is skeptical of the merits of a global treaty 
for access to international cloud data.115 In his judgment, it is unneces-
sary and undesirable to develop such a broad multilateral agreement 
because comity rules are already in place to handle these matters.116 
Additionally, a treaty regime would likely reach only the lowest common 
denominator to ensure that all parties sign on to the agreement.117 Such 
a low threshold of protection for the purposes of gaining consensus 
would likely threaten due process and other individual rights. The many 
undemocratic states throughout the world would demand weak treaty 
provisions to permit them to inundate American cloud providers with 
demands for access to information of their nationals stored in the United 
States.118 
In contrast to Woods, Jennifer Daskal views the “un-territoriality of 
data” as raising fundamentally new challenges.119 She argues that “data 
undermines longstanding assumptions about the link between data loca-
tion and the rights and obligations that should apply.”120 Digital infor-
mation is different because data now ﬂow across international borders 
with “ease, speed, and unpredictability.”121 Moreover, there is a physical 
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disconnect between the location of the data and the location of the user.122 
Indeed, cloud users may not even know where their information is 
located.123 As Daskal states, “Whereas territoriality depends on the ability 
to define the relevant ‘here’ and ‘there,’ data is everywhere and anywhere 
and calls into question which ‘here’ and ‘there’ matter.”124 In sum, “[d]ata 
is shaking territoriality at its core.”125 
Daskal warns of new risks in a world where territoriality lacks its for-
mer normative signiﬁcance. In particular, her chief message is to caution 
against “the kind of unilateral, extraterritorial law enforcement that elec-
tronic data encourages—in which nations compel the production of data 
located anywhere around the globe, without regard to the sovereign 
interests of other nations.”126 Daskal further argues that this result would 
impose another set of costs, including “the balkanization of the Internet 
into multiple, closed-off systems.”127 Her policy solution is to call for “a 
series of bilateral or multilateral agreements among a handful of like-
minded nations.”128 As this Article discusses below, the CLOUD Act cre-
ates a process for reaching such agreements for the international law 
enforcement community and permits these accords to reach beyond the 
relatively limited authorities found in the SCA.129 As for Daskal, her pro-
posed solutions depend on jurisdictional tests that apply to both regula-
tory and compulsory process goals.130 In shaping these solutions, 
Congress and the executive branch should both be involved.131 
Daskal also rejects data location as the sole determinant of the rules 
that should apply.132 She points to a need for better alternative approaches. 
Jurisdiction could be based on the nature of the crime and the 
requesting government’s interest in prosecution.133 Daskal suggests that 
such factors might supplement or substitute for other factors. Another 
possible jurisdictional approach would look to “the place where the 
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company controlling the data operates or maintains its headquarters; 
user nationality; or user location.”134 Under such a framework, many 
jurisdictional ﬂowers would bloom in place of the current approach of 
“unilateral, extraterritorial law enforcement.”135 In time, the hope is that 
a series of tailored, superior approaches would emerge to the “un-
territoriality” of data.136 
2. Initial Lessons. — Four preliminary conclusions can be reached at 
this juncture. First, regarding the extent to which the cloud raises new 
legal issues, the best answer is “it depends.” Data servers are certainly 
bolted to a particular geographical territory, but they are also networked 
globally. For data in clouds, there is a new kind of malleability concerning 
data location, service provider location, and accessing party location.137 
Moreover, the information at stake is not just another form of intangible 
property. Unlike the kinds of assets that Woods points to, such as debts or 
stocks,138 the issue of propertization of personal information is highly 
contested.139 There is also no agreement in the United States as to the 
extent that personal information should be viewed as the property of an 
individual, and, even more to the point, it is unclear how propertization 
would clarify questions relating to access to global cloud data.140 
At the same time, data in the cloud raise different issues than, for 
example, data in a ﬁling cabinet. Most crucially, one size does not ﬁt all 
when current law assesses legal access to global clouds. Analysis must con-
sider the precise kind of cloud model that is at issue. Hence, to Daskal’s 
point about the “un-territoriality of data,” some clouds do not call into 
question the “here” and “there.”141 For example, one can consider a 
cloud located in a single country as roughly analogous to the lockers of a 
self-storage company located in a single jurisdiction.142 Such data opera-
tions, which this Article terms complete Data Localization clouds, are not 
“shaking territoriality at its core.”143 Hence, there is no special paradig-
matic value in the viewpoint of either the data exceptionalists (Daskal) or 
the camp arguing for business as usual (Woods). 
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The key requirement is to consider how different cloud models 
function and the implications for global data access. Yet, as the brief sur-
vey above of Microsoft Ireland and Google Pennsylvania demonstrates, 
judicial awareness of the implications of the different network models 
appears scant. Judges in cloud access cases are divided among the data 
exceptionalists or the business-as-usual proponents for data access issues. 
These different perspectives still lead to different results in judging data 
access requests post–CLOUD Act. 
This Article already discussed Judge Susan Carney’s insistence that 
“even messages stored in the ‘cloud’ have a discernible physical loca-
tion.”144 Thus, there is ultimately nothing new concerning this request in 
her view, and Judge Carney can be said to belong to the business-as-usual 
camp. For a Data Shard cloud, however, such a location is evanescent, 
and this categorization is not helpful.145 
The Second Circuit’s denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in 
Microsoft Ireland further illustrates the judicial struggle to understand 
different cloud models.146 The dissenting judges in the rehearing grap-
pled with the question of the nature of different cloud networks and, at 
times, conﬂated different cloud models. In his dissent, for example, 
Judge Dennis Jacobs adopted the business-as-usual perspective.147 For 
him, the only question was where Microsoft had access to the data. Thus, 
the physical location of information mattered, but only for deciding the 
question of where Microsoft could access it. As Judge Jacobs noted, “It 
need only touch some keys in Redmond, Washington.”148 All other ques-
tions about territoriality were unhelpful in his view, and in a cri de coeur, 
he warned against those who would promote “reifying the notional.”149 
In his view, “Localizing the data in Ireland is not marginally more useful 
than thinking of Santa Claus as a denizen of the North Pole.”150 To him, 
it does not matter where Santa Claus lives, and it does not matter where 
data are stored; data in the cloud do not raise new issues. In case anyone 
missed the point, Judge Jacobs provided a ﬁnal dramatic ﬂourish: 
“Where are the snows of yesteryear?”151 
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At the oral hearing in Microsoft Ireland, the Supreme Court similarly 
struggled to understand differences in cloud models and the relative 
significance of where one accessed data versus where one stored it.152 
The Justices strove to develop analogies and metaphors that would allow 
them to grasp the nature of cloud computers and whether there was 
something new under the sun that existing law did not capture. For 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Microsoft computers were located in 
Ireland, and “something ha[d] to happen to those computers in order to 
get these e-mails back to the United States.”153 This would be a business-
as-usual perspective.154 In contrast, Justice Anthony Kennedy wondered if 
a Microsoft employee present in Ireland had to act on the computer on 
which the data was stored.155 Did “some person have to be there?” he 
asked.156 This line of questioning might have opened the door to adop-
tion of a data exceptionalism viewpoint.157 In response and perhaps 
pointing in this direction, Joshua Rosenkranz, Microsoft’s attorney, came 
up with the idea of a “robot” being sent “into a foreign land to seize evi-
dence,” which “would certainly implicate foreign interests.”158 
This attempt to explain cloud computing through robot messengers 
proved to have limited appeal for the high court. At that junction, Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor stated, “I’m sorry . . . I guess my imagination is running 
wild,” and asked, “[W]ho tells the robot what to do and what does the 
robot do?”159 The answer from Rosenkranz: The cloud provider would 
send the robot instructions to execute in the foreign land.160 This 
explanation did not appear to gain traction.161 Finally, Justice Ginsburg 
wondered whether “in this brave new world,” it might “be wiser just to 
say let’s leave things as they are” and let Congress regulate if it wants.162 
In sum, and in line with the ﬁrst point, data in the cloud can raise differ-
ent and new legal questions, but no simple perspective—whether loca-
tion of data, territoriality, or access—will be sufficient. 
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Second, Data Trust clouds point to an additional lesson previously 
mentioned—namely divisibility. It is now possible to separate manage-
ment of networked information from the ability to access it.163 This divi-
sion can be achieved through technology (software that places access 
controls in the hands of a Data Trustee).164 It can be further bolstered 
through domestic law (through the creation of a formal Data Trust).165 
This aspect of cloud services is likely to increase in importance in the 
future; as this Article explores below, an increase in governmental 
requests through the subpoena process will heighten the attractiveness of 
Data Trust networks. This result follows because divisibility of control in 
this kind of cloud network heightens the insulation of such non-U.S. 
clouds from subpoenas.166 The law must now take divisibility into account 
in its rules for access to global data. 
Third, Daskal’s prediction about internet balkanization has already 
been validated. There are several causes for this phenomenon: technical 
localization, consumer demand, and legal data localization. This Article 
has distinguished between technical data localization, in which network 
management structures the localization, and legal data localization, in 
which a statute or other kind of legal mechanism mandates the localiza-
tion. In part, technical data localization is being driven on the demand 
side. International privacy advocates are skeptical of U.S. tech companies 
in general and their global clouds in particular; their call is for a home-
grown digital infrastructure. Thus, in warning against U.S. clouds, 
German investigative reporters Stefan Aust and Thomas Ammann advo-
cate development of “a stronger European data protection” as part of a 
“self-conscious development” of an independent European digital infra-
structure.167 One beneﬁt will be to end the “tacit transmission of our 
information to U.S. intelligence services.”168 Moreover, just as green tech-
nology can be a factor for economic growth, Aust and Ammann believe 
strong data protection laws will stimulate a native digital industry in 
Germany and the European Union.169 
Customers in many countries also want to keep their data within 
their own country, and the market for cloud services has responded with 
a new set of services. As Professor Peter Swire and Justin Hemmings write, 
“[C]ompanies have sought ways to show global customers their careful 
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stewardship of private data.”170 U.S. tech companies have experienced 
monetary losses from the decisions made post-Snowden in the global 
marketplace and are now responding by offering localized services.171 In a 
joint amicus brief before the Second Circuit in Microsoft Ireland, Verizon, 
Cisco, Salesforce, and other corporations cautioned about the 
counterproductive impact of extending extraterritorial effect to the 
SCA.172 The tech companies warned: “Foreign customers will respond by 
moving their business to foreign companies without a presence in the 
United States, ultimately frustrating the interests of the U.S. government 
in general . . . .”173 To some extent, the CLOUD Act speaks to this 
concern by leveling the differences between U.S. and non-U.S. cloud 
providers for non-U.S. customers.174 At the same time, and as will be 
discussed below, some differences still remain that make non-U.S. clouds 
attractive for customers outside the United States. These customers’ 
ability to route around the law, at least to some extent, by using non-U.S. 
clouds will persist post–CLOUD Act given the sweep of other U.S. statutory 
authorities for extraterritorial data access. 
Data localization is also being driven by legal requirements. European 
law already contains occasional mandates for legal data localization. For 
example, a recent German law requires providers of publicly available 
telecommunications services to store certain traffic data within 
Germany.175 Outside the European Union, nondemocratic countries, 
such as Russia, have enacted different kinds of legal data localization 
requirements.176 There are multiple reasons for these laws, including 
protectionism for native tech companies and making surveillance easier 
for domestic intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies.177 The 
perverse result, as Chander and Lê argue, is that the centralizing of user 
information can also lighten the surveillance burden for outside intelli-
gence agencies.178 
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Fourth, and most critically, policy in this area must be based on a 
dynamic analysis of the interaction of legal rules and cloud technology. 
The technology of the cloud now provides a way to route around law. 
The development of Data Localization clouds as well as Data Trust clouds 
shows that more companies and individuals outside of the United States 
have ways to shelter their data beyond the SCA’s reach. Sound policymak-
ing requires anticipation of the likely interplay of the resulting cycles of 
interaction between technology and law. This dynamic extends beyond 
the SCA, as amended by the CLOUD Act; policymakers must consider 
the full range of legal authorities and how law and technology interact to 
affect the scope of these different means for gaining access to cloud data. 
This Article will now carry out this task and examine the law permitting 
government and private parties extraterritorial access to data held in non-
U.S. clouds. 
II. EVALUATING LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL  
ACCESS TO DATA 
This Article argues that different cloud management models raise 
distinct issues concerning extraterritorial requests for information. In 
section I.A, this Article looked at the assessment by two courts of a law 
enforcement data request made pursuant to the SCA. In addition to the 
SCA, U.S. law provides other ways for parties to seek access to infor-
mation held abroad. This Article now explores these legal authorities. It 
distinguishes between the means available to the U.S. government and to 
private parties. For each legal authority, this Part assesses the likely results 
when the information is part of a Data Shard, Data Localization, or Data 
Trust cloud model. It ﬁnds notable differences in the likely outcomes 
following from the same legal authority being applied to different cloud 
management models. 
This Part ﬁnds a likely shift to law enforcement use of subpoena 
power rather than warrant power. It also points to a rising signiﬁcance of 
MLATs, which will incorporate foreign law into data access questions. 
Additionally, there will be increased incentives for non-U.S. customers 
who are concerned about U.S. access to their data to select Data 
Localization and Data Trust clouds. In seeking to cover the applicable 
legal authorities in a concise and clear fashion, this Part concludes each 
section with a summary of the legal authority in question. Finally, an 
Appendix to this Article summarizes the ﬁndings of this Part. A single 
chart can sometimes be worth a thousand words—or even several thou-
sand words. 
A. Extraterritorial Access by the U.S. Government 
In assessing the U.S. government’s access to cloud information, one 
threshold question is the reach of the Fourth Amendment. Other legal 
authorities open to the U.S. government are the MLAT process, the SCA, 
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administrative and grand jury subpoenas, and regulations and statutes 
concerning foreign intelligence surveillance. 
1. The Fourth Amendment. — The Fourth Amendment protects individ-
uals against certain kinds of collection of personal information by the 
government. It safeguards a right of “the people” to be secure against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” of “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.”179 The Fourth Amendment also contains a provision stating that 
no warrants shall be issued except “upon probable cause.”180 But in their 
role of restricting governmental activities, these interests are limited in their 
ability to safeguard data privacy rights against extraterritorial surveillance. 
The Fourth Amendment is a restriction on governmental power, not 
a grant of power.181 Accordingly, the authority to execute search warrants 
on foreign soils must be located elsewhere.182 For example, Microsoft 
Ireland examined whether the SCA could provide such authority to com-
pel a company to disclose data stored outside the United States.183 But 
for the U.S. government to carry out a search or seizure on foreign soil 
without the cooperation of the local government would probably consti-
tute a crime under local law, something U.S. government agents would 
be reluctant to do.184 This reluctance reﬂects, in part, the “well-estab-
lished international law axiom that one state may not unilaterally exer-
cise its law enforcement functions in the territory of another state.”185 
This axiom is reﬂected in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law. It observes, “A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their 
functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the 
other state, given by duly authorized officers of that state.”186 
If the U.S. government were to convince non-U.S. authorities to 
carry out a search and seizure of data stored in their country on behalf of 
the United States, or to look the other way when U.S. agents committed 
the search and seizure themselves, however, the Fourth Amendment 
might limit this application. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the 
Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
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restrictions do not apply extraterritorially to people without “signiﬁcant 
voluntary connection[s]” to the United States.187 While a warrant is not 
required for searches outside the United States, Verdugo-Urquidez has also 
been interpreted to mean that the Amendment’s reasonableness require-
ment applies to searches outside the United States, but only if they 
involve a U.S. person or a person with signiﬁcant contacts with the 
United States.188 In this reading, the Fourth Amendment demands “rea-
sonableness,” but not a warrant for certain searches outside the United 
States. 
The applicable circuit precedent is split, however, on what “reasona-
bleness” requires in this context. The Ninth Circuit has found that the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test requires that the U.S. govern-
ment, when conducting a search abroad, comply with the foreign law in 
the jurisdiction where the search occurs.189 In contrast, the Second and 
Seventh Circuits have held that Fourth Amendment reasonableness for 
extraterritorial searches requires a balancing of the government’s need 
for the information and the privacy interest at stake.190 Most crucially, the 
extent of Fourth Amendment protection will vary depending on whether 
a cloud is organized as a Data Shard, Data Localization, or Data Trust 
network. 
Finally, there is the issue of the Third-Party Doctrine. It dictates that 
people who voluntarily give information to so-called third parties have no 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment.191 
Among other kinds of information, the Supreme Court has applied the 
Third-Party Doctrine to bank records and telephone numbers dialed from, 
or received by, a device.192 
Three key decisions have developed the doctrine thus far. First was 
United States v. Miller, a 1976 Supreme Court decision that, for purposes 
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of its Fourth Amendment analysis, found that checks were the bank’s 
“business records” and not the “private papers” of the depositors.193 
Building on Miller, the Court then held in Smith v. Maryland in 1979 that 
law enforcement’s use of a pen register, a device that recorded numbers 
dialed, did not implicate Fourth Amendment rights.194 When Smith 
placed a call, he “voluntarily conveyed” the telephone numbers to the 
phone company.195 In June 2018, however, in Carpenter v. United States, 
the Court placed a signiﬁcant new limitation on the Third-Party 
Doctrine.196 
The Carpenter opinion concerned cell-site location information 
(CSLI). For the Supreme Court, government acquisition of CSLI was a 
Fourth Amendment search that generally required a warrant. It declared 
that there was “a world of difference between the limited types of per-
sonal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive 
chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers 
today.”197 The Court emphasized the “unique nature of cell phone loca-
tion information,” which provided a unique set of locational data derived, 
in part, from the tendency of individuals to “compulsively carry cell 
phones with them all the time.”198 
It is, therefore, an open question whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies to information stored in a cloud, either extraterritorially or 
domestically. Cloud information may be seen as akin to what Justice 
Kennedy called “the modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own 
‘papers’ or ‘effects.’”199 Such information does seem distinguishable from 
a mere telephone number or a negotiable instrument, such as a check. For 
example, the format of that information is decided by a telephone company 
or financial institution respectively and not by the party who generates it. 
On the other hand, a future court may try to distinguish cloud 
information from the “increasingly precise CSLI” to which the Carpenter 
Court extended the Fourth Amendment.200 
a. Data Shards. — We begin with an analysis of a governmental 
request for information located outside the United States and stored in a 
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Data Shard cloud. As a threshold matter, the Fourth Amendment is 
only applicable when a search or seizure occurs. As an example of an 
activity that does not reach this threshold, a police officer that observes 
illegal behavior carried out in “plain view” is not considered to be 
conducting a search and, hence, does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.201 
For Fourth Amendment purposes, however, courts are likely to con-
sider the government’s collection of information from a Data Shard 
cloud to be a “search.” Indeed, the Google Pennsylvania court reached this 
conclusion.202 Similarly, Orin Kerr, the leading scholar of electronic 
criminal procedure, has long argued that a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when “information from or about the data is exposed to possible 
human observation, such as when it appears on a [computer] screen.”203 
If retrieval is considered a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, 
the next question under Verdugo-Urquidez is whether the information in 
question belongs to a U.S. person or an entity that otherwise has signiﬁ-
cant contacts with the United States.204 If the answer is yes, the Fourth 
Amendment safeguards such information because a search conducted 
within the United States triggers its probable cause requirement. Accord-
ingly, U.S. customers of Data Shard services will likely receive Fourth 
Amendment protection, while foreign users of these clouds will not. 
b. Data Localization and Data Trusts. — The Fourth Amendment analy-
sis can be combined for these two network variants, as this constitutional 
provision is likely to prove of limited applicability for both clouds due to 
the same factors. An extraterritorial search of data belonging to a non-
U.S. person generally does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.205 In 
other words, these constitutional protections do not apply to searches of 
property held in a location outside the United States and owned by a 
foreign party. Many clients of Data Localization or Data Trust clouds are 
likely to be non-U.S. persons and, therefore, receive no Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
If a non-U.S. person can meet the Verdugo-Urquidez test, however, there 
may be Fourth Amendment protections for information stored in a Data 
Localization or Data Trust cloud and searched outside the United States. 
The Verdugo-Urquidez test does not require a warrant, with its heightened 
requirement of probable cause, for searches outside the United States, 
but only “reasonableness.”206 Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which 
looks to compliance with foreign law in the jurisdiction where the search 
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occurs, the Data Trustee will only be obliged to comply with search 
requests that fulfill the requirements of foreign domestic law.207 As for the 
Data Manager, like the Data Trustee, it would not reasonably be expected 
to violate the respective foreign law of trusts to comply with this request. 
Should this analysis be applied to Microsoft Cloud Germany, U.S. courts 
that follow the Ninth Circuit are likely to honor the validity of the Data 
Trust model. 
There is less certainty regarding the test shared by the Second and 
Seventh Circuits.208 These appellate courts have held that Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness for extraterritorial searches requires balanc-
ing the government’s need for the information with the privacy interest 
at stake.209 Restricting the analysis to the European Union, the require-
ments of E.U. and Member States’ “data protection” laws demonstrate a 
strong interest in privacy.210 E.U. data protection law has a strong anchor-
ing in the constitutional law of the European Union as well as of Member 
States.211 For example, there are at least three important foundational 
expressions of a constitutional right of privacy in the European Union: 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.212 There is also important case law 
regarding information privacy from the European Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Justice.213 
As a ﬁnal caution, the analysis here must necessarily be fact speciﬁc. 
If a non-U.S. person or company has sufficient contacts with the United 
States to be considered part of the U.S. “national community,” the Fourth 
Amendment might apply even to information stored overseas.214 Such a 
relationship might be created through physical contacts with the United 
States or a legal relationship, such as being a resident alien.215 
c. Fourth Amendment Summary. Information stored in a Data Shard 
cloud will receive Fourth Amendment protections when the data belongs 
to a U.S. person or a person with significant contacts with the United 
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States. In contrast, non-U.S. users of such clouds will not receive Fourth 
Amendment protection. Information stored in extraterritorial Data 
Localization and Data Trust clouds is likely to fall outside the reach of 
the Fourth Amendment, though the required analysis must be fact 
speciﬁc. 
2. The SCA. — This Article has already examined how judges inter-
preted the (old) SCA in Microsoft Ireland and Google Pennsylvania.216 The 
SCA forms part of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA), 
which supplies the current framework for federal surveillance law.217 
Enacted in 1986, the SCA is the most important part of ECPA for 
international clouds; it regulates access to certain kinds of communica-
tion, namely “stored wire and electronic communications and transac-
tional records,” when in “electronic storage,” which is where cloud data 
spends most of its life cycle.218 With Microsoft Ireland before the Supreme 
Court, however, Congress acted “in this brave new world” and amended 
the statute, as Justice Ginsburg had recommended.219 
The relevant architecture of the SCA, both pre– and post–CLOUD 
Act, can be quickly summarized. Section 2702 limits the disclosure of 
stored communications by service providers except for certain listed 
exceptions.220 Section 2703 establishes the conditions under which the 
government may require a service provider to disclose the content of 
communications covered by the SCA.221 Finally, the SCA requires war-
rants to be issued under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.222 
What changed with the enactment of the CLOUD Act? Primarily, 
this statute largely ﬂattens the potential for disparate treatment of differ-
ent kinds of clouds.223 Some subtle differences do still remain, however, 
and the necessary judicial analysis for contested data requests will be 
highly fact speciﬁc. Three initial points demonstrate how the CLOUD 
Act has changed the SCA. 
First, the CLOUD Act makes clear that the reach of the SCA is inter-
national.224 As discussed earlier, the Second Circuit in Microsoft Ireland 
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answered this previously open issue about SCA warrants in the negative,225 
and the magistrate judge in Google Pennsylvania—as well as judges in a 
few other courts—answered it in the affirmative.226 The CLOUD Act then 
amended the SCA by requiring electronic communication service pro-
viders to comply with its provisions “regardless of whether such commu-
nication, record, or other information is located within or outside of 
the United States.”227 The critical test is whether the covered information 
is “within such provider’s possession, custody, or control.”228 The 
language of “possession, custody, or control” echoes that required, of 
course, for a subpoena pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
Rule 45.229 In short, Congress has made it clear that SCA warrants have 
an international reach. This part of the statute can be viewed as Step 
One; it takes effect immediately. 
Second, the CLOUD Act includes two comity provisions, one general 
and one speciﬁc, which are both of great importance to cloud providers. 
The general one, discussed in section 103(c), takes effect as part of the 
statute’s Step One.230 As for the speciﬁc comity clause, it creates a new 
process for executive agreements with “qualifying foreign governments,” 
along with accompanying new safeguards for cloud providers.231 This is 
the statute’s Step Two, and it only takes effect once there are such execu-
tive agreements.232 No such agreements are in place, but relevant 
negotiations are underway between the United States and the United 
Kingdom.233 These amendments to the SCA regarding comity break 
important new ground; their importance for future legal access to the 
global cloud cannot be overstated. As Daskal noted, “no comity claim 
[had] ever been invoked in connection with an SCA warrant” prior to 
the CLOUD Act.234 That state of affairs is now destined to change. 
To qualify for an executive agreement, a foreign nation must pro-
vide protections to their cloud providers that are similar to those speci-
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ﬁed under the CLOUD Act. Once a nation qualiﬁes under this statutory 
provision, a cloud provider may seek to quash a disclosure request for a 
customer who is not a U.S. person or a U.S. resident and for whom the 
disclosure of data “would create a material risk that the provider would 
violate the laws of a qualifying foreign government.”235 The CLOUD Act 
then spells out a detailed blueprint for the ensuing comity analysis.236 
Beyond the speciﬁc comity clause, and as noted above, the SCA also 
has a general comity provision for countries without an executive agree-
ment.237 This provision is tucked away in a short subsection of the statute 
labeled “Rule of Construction.”238 Presciently, the authors of the CLOUD 
Act seemed to realize that an international extension of the SCA would 
bring more cloud providers into conﬂict with national law. Hence, the 
statute makes it clear that “comity analysis” pursuant to “common law 
standards” is available for SCA orders issued extraterritorially in 
instances in which no executive agreement exists with the target coun-
try.239 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations has the most 
inﬂuential expression of these common law standards.240 
As an illustration, consider a foreign cloud provider in Freedonia, a 
ﬁctional country, faced with a data request about a Freedonian citizen 
but without a qualifying agreement with the United States.241 Indeed, to 
develop the hypothetical further, Freedonian law limits these kinds of 
data transfers to the United States due to privacy considerations and 
imposes strong penalties on domestic providers that violate its law. The 
result? Through a motion in a U.S. court, a cloud provider in Freedonia 
could seek to quash the SCA warrant by raising the issue of comity.242 In 
the Congressional Research Service’s reading of this venerable doctrine, 
it notes, 
Common law comity principles generally dictate that U.S. legal 
obligations can be avoided as a result of foreign law only when 
the person or entity in question acted in good faith to avoid the 
conﬂict, but there remains a likelihood of severe sanctions in 
the foreign nation for failure to comply with foreign law.243 
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As will be discussed below, some companies in the European Union 
have met this test in resisting discovery requests in the context of U.S. 
civil litigation.244 Thus, the CLOUD Act both extends extraterritoriality to 
the SCA and gives foreign providers new paths for contesting SCA war-
rants. 
Finally, the CLOUD Act lifts ECPA’s blocking provisions for U.S. 
cloud providers. Prior to amendment, the SCA’s § 2702 prevented for-
eign governments from directly acquiring the contents of electronic com-
munications.245 This aspect of the law meant foreign governments used 
MLATs or letters rogatory when seeking the U.S. government’s assistance 
in obtaining disclosure.246 The new law amends § 2702 by adding lan-
guage that permits disclosure to a qualifying foreign government, which 
is, as noted above, one that signs an executive agreement with the United 
States.247 In addition to dropping ECPA’s previous prohibition on disclo-
sure to foreign governments, the CLOUD Act immunizes cloud providers 
who comply with such foreign governmental requests from civil or crimi-
nal penalties in the United States.248 
a. Data Shards. — With the enactment of the CLOUD Act, an SCA war-
rant can be used to compel a request for information stored extraterri-
torially but accessed within the United States. At least in this context, the 
Data Shard model no longer raises the danger of law enforcement going 
dark. Location of data outside the United States does not place a cloud 
provider and its servers outside the reach of the SCA. 
At the same time, however, the amended SCA now provides Data 
Shard clouds with explicit protections for their foreign customers. First, 
under the speciﬁc comity provision of the CLOUD Act, a Data Shard 
cloud can contest requests for data of non-U.S. persons if compliance 
with the SCA warrant would violate the law of a “qualifying foreign gov-
ernment.”249 Second, in the absence of such a qualifying executive agree-
ment, a Data Shard cloud can make use of the general comity provisions 
when compliance with an SCA request would similarly violate foreign 
law.250 
Under the resulting comity analysis, a Data Shard cloud accessed in 
the United States may receive somewhat less protection than other kinds 
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of clouds that are extraterritorial. This result follows both under general 
and speciﬁc comity analyses.251 For a non-U.S. person in a country with a 
qualifying agreement, one factor in the CLOUD Act calls for assessment 
of “the nature and extent of the provider’s ties to and presence in the 
United States.”252 A Data Shard cloud run by a U.S. provider who accesses 
stored data in the United States arguably has strong ties to this country; 
this factor would weigh in favor of upholding an SCA warrant for the 
cloud data of the non-U.S. person. A similar comity factor exists under 
the common law test established by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations.253 A provider’s connection to the United States, however, is 
only one of eight factors (under the CLOUD Act’s speciﬁc provision)254 
or ﬁve (under the Restatement),255 respectively. 
Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service notes, the comity 
analysis “is likely to be a highly fact-speciﬁc evaluation that depends on 
the speciﬁc circumstances of a demand for data stored overseas.”256 For 
example, in addition to ties to and presence in the United States, other 
factors assess the importance of the sought-after information to the 
investigation as well as the “interests of the United States, including the 
investigative interests of the governmental entity seeking to require the 
disclosure.”257 A court may well order compliance with an SCA warrant 
for any of the three kinds of clouds in cases in which timely and effective 
access to the information bears on a matter of great signiﬁcance.258 
b. Data Localization. — The CLOUD Act makes it clear that the SCA 
now extends to both complete and partial Data Localization clouds. Simi-
lar to the law’s treatment of Data Shard clouds, the law also provides 
these clouds with a path to quash SCA warrants. In the resulting comity 
analysis, a critical factor concerns a provider’s “ties to and presence in” 
the United States.259 Under this factor, the law grants a complete Data 
Localization cloud some level of increased protection compared to a par-
tial Data Localization cloud, like the one involved in the Microsoft Ireland 
case. In that latter cloud model, the information is located abroad, but a 
service provider can access it from within the United States.260 The partial 
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Data Localization cloud has stronger ties to and presence in the United 
States than does a complete Data Localization cloud located outside this 
country.261 
c. Data Trusts. — Like Data Shard and Data Localization clouds, Data 
Trusts are now subject to SCA requests. After all, the law now applies 
regardless of whether sought-after information “is located within or out-
side of the United States.”262 But cloud providers involved with a Data 
Trust are afforded a new kind of insulation from U.S. data requests. This 
result follows because Data Trust clouds split access to customer data 
from the management of it.263 
Because the CLOUD Act covers only data within a provider’s 
“possession, custody, or control,”264 Data Trust cloud providers can lever-
age their split access-management structure for their beneﬁt. A party run-
ning a Data Trust cloud will have a strong defense under this standard, 
whether as a legal or as a technical matter. Its argument will be that it 
may have “possession, custody, or control”265 of encrypted 1s and 0s, but 
not of the underlying information that these encoded data represent.266 
Moreover, this party has entered into a trust agreement under which it 
has promised not to seek access to the information. By separating access 
to the data from management of the servers, this service model permits 
U.S. cloud providers to run non-U.S. clouds while avoiding the entan-
gling statutory question as to whether they possess, have custody of, or 
control the information. Thus, the cloud provider will likely be on solid 
ground in referring SCA requests to the Data Trustee. In turn, the Data 
Trustee will be governed, in the ﬁrst instance, by the law of the non-U.S. 
jurisdiction of the cloud in question.267 In the United States, the law will 
then evaluate a Data Trustee’s refusal to comply under the same comity 
analysis as for the provider who runs a complete Data Localization cloud. 
d. SCA Summary. — All three cloud models now fall within the scope 
of the SCA. To a large extent, moreover, the CLOUD Act ensures that the 
law treats different kinds of clouds in a generally similar fashion. All 
three cloud models are now subject to SCA requests. In addition, a for-
eign customer of a Data Shard cloud or partial Data Localization cloud 
no longer faces weaker rights under the SCA because of the cloud pro-
vider’s ability to access her data from within the United States. 
Nonetheless, the CLOUD Act creates an opening for a comity analy-
sis that treats these cloud models differently. If a Data Shard cloud is 
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located within the United States, its “ties to and presence in” this country 
will be a factor weighing in favor of compliance with an SCA warrant.268 
As for Data Localization clouds, comity analysis will favor upholding an 
SCA warrant for a complete Data Localization cloud, one in which the 
data are located outside the United States and are accessible only outside 
this country. In that case, the provider’s “ties to and presence in” the 
United States are weaker.269 
Finally, of the three models, a Data Trust cloud has a different kind 
of insulation from extraterritorial use of the SCA. The provider can 
argue that it does not meet the statutory threshold of being a party with 
“possession, custody, or control.”270 Under the Data Trust model, the 
cloud provider will likely be able to direct such requests to the Data 
Trustee, who will reference the non-U.S. law of the jurisdiction where the 
respective cloud is located when responding to the request. Under the 
resulting comity analysis, a U.S. court is likely to treat the Data Trustee in 
a similar fashion to a provider running a complete Data Localization 
cloud. As a ﬁnal caveat, one should note that comity analysis, whether 
general or speciﬁc, looks to other factors, such as the penalties following 
in a foreign jurisdiction for compliance with the order and the 
importance of the sought-after data to an investigation or litigation.271 
3. MLATs. — A long-established way for the U.S. government to 
access private information held abroad is through Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties. These agreements permit a public authority seeking 
data to ask for the assistance of the country in which the data is held and 
require that country to cooperate in processing such requests under its 
domestic law.272 MLATs establish legal mechanisms for cooperation 
between signatory nations in criminal matters and proceedings, includ-
ing the exchange of evidence and information during criminal 
proceedings.273 
Even with enactment of the CLOUD Act, the MLAT process remains 
relevant. First, the data requests of U.S. law enforcement may fall outside 
the SCA, which regulates access to “stored wire and electronic 
communications and transactional records” when in “electronic stor-
age.”274 Thus, Microsoft Ireland concerned the U.S. government’s attempt 
to obtain access to emails.275 The SCA also covers information that is 
uploaded to and stored with cloud providers, who will generally fall under 
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its two idiosyncratic legislative terms of art, “electronic communication 
service” (ECS) or “remote computing service” (RCS), and hence will be 
covered by this statute.276 Yet, post–CLOUD Act amendment, the SCA 
still does not cover a variety of information that a business has gathered 
for its own purposes about its customers. 
It is now common for companies to track and create proﬁles of their 
customers, clients, or users. In doing so, these entities are not acting as 
an ECS or RCS and do not fall within the SCA. MLATs do reach such 
data; as one summary noted, “MLATs generally obligate nations to sum-
mon witnesses, compel the production of documents and other evi-
dence, issue warrants, and serve process.”277 
Second, while this law foresees development of a new system of inter-
national data sharing around executive agreements, there are no such 
arrangements currently in place. Hence, foreign governments are still 
obligated to use the MLAT process when they seek data from the United 
States. Indeed, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
requests from foreign countries to the Department of Justice for assis-
tance in obtaining data and other evidence in the United States.278 In 
short, MLATs remain important—and they also come in many different 
forms. 
MLATs can be bilateral, multilateral, regional, and country-to-regional. 
According to one estimate, “[t]here are hundreds of bilateral MLATs” 
throughout the world.279 For example, the United States has MLATs in 
place with numerous E.U. Member States and with the European Union 
itself.280 Building on the E.U.–U.S. MLAT, these two entities also signed 
an Umbrella Agreement in June 2016 to increase law enforcement 
cooperation while setting “high standards for the protection of personal 
data transferred by law-enforcement authorities.”281 
The use of MLATs has been widely criticized, however, as time-con-
suming and inefficient. The district court in Microsoft Ireland singled it 
out as impractical.282 Woods also speaks of the “extremely long time” that 
an MLAT request typically takes to complete.283 He notes: “The entire 
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process has been estimated to take an average of ten months, and in 
some cases can take much longer.”284 In testimony before Congress, 
Christopher Kelly, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, ﬂatly 
stated that the “MLAT process . . . is not a viable solution” to the prob-
lem of law enforcement access to international cloud data.285 
a. Data Shards. — Analysis regarding the Data Shard cloud is clear: 
The MLAT process is irrelevant because courts will consider the locus of 
the search to be domestic in nature. In fact, the MLAT process is also 
likely to be considered irrelevant for another reason. As Magistrate Judge 
Rueter noted in Google Pennsylvania, information in this cloud model is 
constantly shifting from country to country.286 Hence, in language 
regarding going dark that this Article has already cited, Magistrate Judge 
Rueter noted that “no one knows which country to ask, and even if 
speciﬁc servers could be identiﬁed, the data may no longer be there by 
the time its location has been identiﬁed.”287 While the CLOUD Act makes 
it clear that the SCA extends extraterritorially, the statute does not cover 
all possible requests for information.288 Hence, the problem of going 
dark might still arise: A request to a Data Shard cloud pursuant to the 
MLAT process, as opposed to the domestic U.S. process, would be 
stymied due to an inability to identify the foreign government to which a 
data request should be made. 
b. Data Localization. — Information requests to a Data Localization 
cloud under the MLAT process would proceed under speciﬁc national 
and regional agreements. For Europe, moreover, the 2016 Umbrella 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States estab-
lishes additional protections before E.U. law enforcement agencies can 
give data to U.S. law enforcement agencies.289 This Agreement does not 
provide a new substantive basis for such exchanges, which would 
continue to be governed by the law of the E.U. Member State to which 
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the information request is directed. Rather, it makes such transfers 
subject to an overarching set of principles, which are also found in that 
same year’s Privacy Shield agreement with the United States.290 
Speciﬁcally, the principles include limitations on data use, a right to 
access and rectiﬁcation of information, and judicial redress before U.S. 
courts should U.S. authorities fail to comply with its requirements for access 
or rectification.291 
c. Data Trusts. — Under the Data Trust model, an MLAT request 
would be directed to the Data Trustee, not the service provider. Only 
the former would have the technical ability to access the information as 
well as the legal authority to do so under the binding local trust 
arrangement. Signiﬁcantly, the Data Trust arrangement would reduce 
any ambiguity as to whether an information request by U.S. law 
enforcement was occurring extraterritorially. It would make it clear that 
the location of the data was outside the United States and the search of the 
data was also extraterritorial in nature. 
To explore how such MLAT access would proceed, we can consider 
the Microsoft Cloud Germany. Were U.S. law enforcement to seek data in 
Germany stored in this network that was not covered by the SCA, it would 
turn to T-Systems, the Data Trustee, pursuant to the U.S.–Germany treaty 
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.292 Article 12(1) of the 
U.S.–Germany MLAT foresees the use of “surveillance of telecommunica-
tions” as a justiﬁcation for an extraterritorial data request.293 At the same 
time, however, the law of the “Requested State”—namely, Germany—
“governing criminal investigations or proceedings” would apply to such a 
request.294 This language means that a request by U.S. law enforcement 
for information stored in the German cloud would be judged according 
to German Criminal Procedure Law (StPO).295 Between the protections 
of E.U. Member State law and those of the Umbrella Agreement, the 
MLAT process provides strong safeguards for users of E.U.-stored data. 
d. MLAT Summary. — Under the three cloud management models, 
different results occur when data requests are made pursuant to MLATs. 
First, Data Shard clouds are not likely to implicate MLATs as the data 
request will be considered purely domestic. Second, Data Localization 
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clouds in the European Union will have strong protections against U.S. 
data requests under the Umbrella Agreement and E.U. Member State 
law. Third, MLATs are likely to remain relevant to foreign governments 
in the absence of executive agreements pursuant to the CLOUD Act. 
Finally, MLAT requests for information in a Data Trust model will be 
made to a Data Trustee, the party with the sole ability to control access to 
the information. 
4. Administrative or Grand Jury Subpoenas. — U.S. law permits the gov-
ernment to issue a subpoena to a company that engages in business inside 
the United States for property under its control that is located outside the 
United States.296 Unlike a warrant, a governmental subpoena is issued 
without judicial involvement. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in its 
Bank of Nova Scotia decision upheld a subpoena authorizing disclosure of 
the banking records of U.S. citizens that a Canadian bank with U.S. 
branches had maintained in the Bahamas.297 The Eleventh Circuit held 
that the bank had to release the records, even though disclosure would 
violate Bahamian law.298 Thus far, no case has applied the Bank of Nova 
Scotia rule to data stored by cloud providers on behalf of third parties. 
Regarding such extraterritorial subpoena requests, case law distin-
guishes between (1) records that a party to litigation holds and (2) 
records that an entity holds on behalf of another party. In some cases, a 
subpoena recipient is “asked to turn over records in which only they have 
a protectable privacy interest.”299 For example, in Marc Rich & Co., the 
Second Circuit “permitted a grand jury subpoena issued in a tax evasion 
investigation to reach the overseas business records of a defendant[’s] 
Swiss commodities trading corporation.”300 The subpoena in Marc Rich & 
Co. was directed to a corporation for its own overseas records. The Marc 
Rich & Co. court found that the grand jury had jurisdiction over the 
corporation under the “territorial principle”; this concept permits 
governments to punish individuals or entities for acts outside their 
boundaries when such acts are “intended to produce and do produce 
detrimental effects within it.”301 
In contrast, a foreign-based entity that holds records on behalf of 
another party is generally considered to have a stronger interest against 
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extraterritorial subpoenas than a non-U.S. entity that is a party to the 
underlying litigation in the United States. This distinction is generally 
supported by a Department of Justice policy expressed in a December 
2017 memorandum concerning data requests to an entity that stores data 
in the cloud. The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section 
summarized the relevant policy as follows: “[P]rosecutors should seek 
data directly from the enterprise, rather than its cloud-storage provider, 
if doing so will not compromise the investigation.”302 
When a subpoena is contested by a non-U.S. party, a U.S. court will 
evaluate the merits of the matter through a comity analysis. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has deﬁned comity as the “spirit of cooperation in which 
a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws 
and interests of other sovereign states.”303 It is a concept of “judicial self-
restraint in furtherance of policy considerations which transcend individ-
ual lawsuits.”304 As this Article has already noted in regards to the 
CLOUD Act’s introduction of comity into ECPA, the resulting analysis 
will be highly fact speciﬁc.305 For example, as the Texas Supreme Court 
stated in recognizing the importance of this principle, comity requires 
careful examination of “[t]he circumstances of each situation.”306 
The leading test for comity is found in the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law.307 It contains a ﬁve-factor analysis, which looks to: 
[1] [T]he importance to the investigation or litigation of the 
documents or other information requested; [2] the degree of 
speciﬁcity of the request; [3] whether the information origi-
nated in the United States; [4] the availability of alternative 
means of securing the information; and [5] the extent to which 
noncompliance with the request would undermine important 
interests of the United States, or compliance with the request 
would undermine important interests of the state where the 
information is located.308 
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Some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, have expanded the required 
analysis by adding additional factors.309 A comity analysis is also common 
when private parties seek information as part of litigation in the United 
States. This point is discussed in more detail below in section II.B.2. 
a. Data Shards. — When a subpoena is presented to a company 
managing a Data Shard cloud, the result is likely to be straightforward. 
For a U.S. court, a foreign jurisdiction is likely to lack a justiﬁable foreign 
relations interest in the information request to a Data Shard cloud.310 
Hence, a comity analysis is likely to be unnecessary, and a subpoena 
issued to a Data Shard cloud would be considered domestic in nature. 
After all, the locus of storage of information is unknown to the user and 
can shift by the time a data request is made and the information is to be 
retrieved.311 
b. Data Localization. — A cloud provider generally holds information 
on behalf of a third party. In Microsoft Ireland, a case about the reach of 
the SCA’s warrant power, the Second Circuit indicated in dicta that it did 
not think that a subpoena should be used to order such information when 
held outside the United States. The court noted it had “never upheld the 
use of a subpoena to compel a recipient to produce an item under its 
control and located overseas when the recipient is merely a caretaker for 
another individual or entity and that individual, not the subpoena recipi-
ent, has a protectable privacy interest in the item.”312 
Other circuits have ruled differently regarding custodial records 
found overseas when the holding entity was a bank.313 As the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations concisely summarizes, “United States courts 
have disagreed on the obligations of non-party custodians, such as banks 
and brokers, with offices in the United States and foreign states.”314 After 
acknowledging such decisions in other circuits upholding subpoenas for 
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overseas bank records, the Microsoft Ireland court drew a distinction 
between banks and cloud providers.315 For the Second Circuit, it had 
been long established that bank customers do not have a privacy interest 
in their records that blocks subpoenas.316 It pointed to United States v. 
Miller, a 1976 Supreme Court decision that found such records, for pur-
poses of Fourth Amendment analysis, to be the bank’s “business records” 
and not the “private papers” of the depositors.317 
In 2018, however, the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States left 
Miller intact but created a new rule for “the rare case where the suspect 
has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.”318 The 
Court found such an interest existed in “a detailed log of a person’s 
movements over several years” and, in particular, in cell-site records.319 In 
the future, courts, like the Second Circuit in Microsoft Ireland, are likely to 
explore the distinction between banks-as-custodians and cloud-providers-
as-custodians.320 Accordingly, much here will depend on how U.S. courts 
carry out their comity analysis. 
c. Data Trusts. — Compared to a Data Localization cloud, a Data 
Trust cloud provides greater protection from subpoena requests. Pursu-
ant to the law of the relevant jurisdiction, only the Data Trustee will be 
authorized to access data stored in this kind of cloud. Here, the question 
of control becomes important. Under applicable U.S. law, the sought-
after information must be “subject to the recipient’s custody or con-
trol.”321 To give a concrete example, Microsoft Germany will be able to 
make a strong argument that information in its German cloud is not 
under its “custody or control.” Under the terms of its trust, only the Data 
Trustee (a third party) can access the information necessary to respond 
to subpoena requests.322 
Moreover, as a technical matter, the Data Trustee controls the actual 
access to the data, which means that Microsoft Germany, as the cloud 
provider, cannot even view customer data in its cloud. In deciding this 
issue of control, courts have looked to the question of whether an entity 
                                                                                                                           
 315. See 829 F.3d at 216.  
 316. Some restrictions on the access to and use of bank records are provided by 
statutory law, such as the federal Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332 (2012). 
 317. See Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d at 216 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
440–41 (1976)). 
 318. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018). 
 319. Id. 
 320. On the continuing validity of the Third-Party Doctrine in garden-variety warrants 
for bank records, see Presley v. United States, 895 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(noting that Miller precludes finding a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in business 
records held by a bank). 
 321. Microsoft Ireland, 829 F.3d at 201. 
 322. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
1728 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:1681 
 
has the “practical ability” to obtain a document.323 Microsoft Germany 
has a strong argument that because it lacks such capacity, the subpoena 
cannot compel it to act. 
A subpoena issued to T-Systems, the Data Trustee, raises different 
issues. Here, there is a party with “custody or control.” A U.S. court might 
consider whether such a Data Trustee is similar to or distinguishable 
from an overseas bank holding U.S. customer records. Arguably, notable 
distinctions can be drawn between this entity and a bank. A bank man-
ages the ﬁnancial transactions of an individual according to standard 
processes that render this information as much the business records of 
the bank as that of the individual.324 In contrast, a Data Trustee does not 
carry out business on behalf of its customer in the fashion that a bank 
does. For example, it does not impose standard formatting requirements 
on items like checks or wire transfers, and it does not interact with other 
entities on the customer’s behalf, as when a bank executes a wire trans-
fer.325 The amount and kind of data collected vary greatly based on the 
customer. And ﬁnally, the Data Trustee may even lack knowledge of or 
ability to access the underlying information if the customer uses her own 
encryption tools.326 
At the same time, however, the Third-Party Doctrine provides a plausi-
ble counterargument. Under this doctrine, as this Article has discussed, 
people who voluntarily give information to so-called third parties have no 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment.327 
Additionally, the Second Circuit in Microsoft Ireland neglected to mention 
that the Third-Party Doctrine has been applied by the Supreme Court 
beyond bank records to include—among other kinds of information—
telephone records.328 That said, a Data Trustee is clearly a non-U.S. based 
entity that holds records on behalf of another party. Hence, it may not 
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seem like a classic third party for a U.S. court.329 Rather, it may fall into 
another category—one that typically triggers the stronger protections of 
comity analysis. 
d. Subpoena Authority Summary. — In the case of a Data Shard cloud, a 
subpoena will be considered domestic in nature. For a Data Localization 
cloud, in contrast, precedents about international subpoenas are not 
conclusive. To further muddy the waters, a cloud holding information for 
a customer can be distinguished in meaningful ways from a bank or 
other ﬁnancial institution. Finally, the Data Trust cloud splits the ability 
to access information in a network from the ability to manage the cloud 
server itself. As a result, the party managing the cloud (the cloud service 
provider) has a strong argument against surrendering data pursuant to a 
subpoena. And, in turn, the Data Trustee has a strong, but different, 
argument that it is a mere caretaker of the information. 
5. Statutory Authority for Foreign Surveillance. — The main statute that 
governs the U.S. government’s foreign intelligence gathering authority is 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).330 This statute requires 
the government to obtain an order from a special court, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), when it wishes to gather “foreign 
intelligence.”331 The government is to make a showing of probable cause 
that the party to be monitored is a “foreign power” or an “agent of a for-
eign power.”332 In a roughly analogous structure to the SCA, FISA’s Title I 
and Title III permit court-ordered access to stored content.333 Laura 
Donohue refers to these aspects of the statute’s pre-9/11 orientation as 
“traditional FISA.”334 
After 9/11, there were many changes in the government’s data 
collection and analysis in this area. In response, Congress sought both to 
amend the law to reﬂect the new practices and to force alterations in 
some of these operations.335 Regarding international cloud computing, 
the most important legal changes are found in provisions of the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA).336 The FAA permits the U.S. govern-
ment to compel service providers in the United States to assist in the 
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“targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”337 If the target 
is a non-U.S. person, probable cause is not required. Rather, the govern-
ment must have a reasonable belief that the target’s location is outside 
the United States.338 Moreover, the activity must be to “acquire foreign 
intelligence information,” which includes information necessary to pro-
tect against foreign threats to the national security of the United 
States.339 
The acquisition of foreign intelligence information is also subject to 
signiﬁcant limits. These include the use of “targeting procedures,” which 
are to be “reasonably designed” to “ensure that any acquisition . . . is lim-
ited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States.”340 The acquisition must also be “conducted only in 
accordance with” some kind of “minimization procedures” to limit the 
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonrelevant information.341 
Cases under the FAA are rare, and there is no case discussing whether 
the Act can be used to compel U.S.-based service providers to disclose 
information stored outside the United States.342 
The FAA is, in fact, mainly focused on surveillance inside the United 
States. The FAA requires U.S.-based service providers to turn over data 
on persons outside the United States, but it mainly contemplates the 
disclosure of data stored or otherwise accessible inside the United States. 
It leaves open the question that Microsoft Ireland answered regarding the 
SCA: Does a statute that is otherwise silent on the issue require U.S.-
based service providers to take action with respect to data stored outside 
the United States? While the Second Circuit resolved that issue for the 
SCA,343 there is no public case about its resolution under the FAA. 
Beyond FISA and the FAA, Executive Order 12,333 deﬁnes—at a 
high level of generality—the authority of the U.S. government to obtain 
access to data stored on computers outside the United States.344 Issued by 
President Ronald Reagan, this Executive Order establishes the overall 
framework for U.S. gathering of foreign intelligence. It grants broad 
authority for the U.S. intelligence community to engage in data collec-
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tion.345 Part 2.3 of the Order permits the collection, retention, and dissem-
ination of the following types of data: “[i]nformation obtained in the 
course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international 
narcotics or international terrorism investigation” as well as “incidentally 
obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may 
violate federal, state, local or foreign laws.”346 
a. Data Shards. — The Data Shard cloud is accessed in the United 
States, and, hence, will be subject to provisions of FISA and the FAA 
regarding searches of stored content in the United States. A Data Shard 
provider will be subject to the same requirements as any other “electronic 
service provider” under these statutes. 
b. Data Localization. — FISA and the FAA do not extend to the cap-
ture of communications that lack some geographic connection with the 
United States.347 Thus, the issue of necessary connection to the United 
States will be a critical question regarding a Data Localization cloud 
accessible within the United States. FISA applies only to the acquisition 
of communications that occur within the United States or when the gov-
ernment is targeting a known U.S. person outside the United States. It 
appears, therefore, that a Data Localization cloud whose content can be 
accessed from the United States will fall under FISA. There is no publicly 
available FISC opinion, however, regarding this issue. 
c. Data Trusts. — If U.S. intelligence seeks to compel cooperation 
from a non-U.S. Data Trust cloud under the FAA, it is unlikely to suc-
ceed. In such a situation, neither the cloud provider nor the Data Trustee 
has accessed communications in the United States. Additionally, these 
parties do not fall within the deﬁnition of “an electronic communication 
service provider” under the Act.348 Both parties would be considered 
non-U.S. service providers that are outside the Act’s jurisdiction. The 
U.S. intelligence community also has power to engage in surveillance of 
information stored electronically pursuant to Executive Order 12,333.349 
Its ability to effectively do so, as under the FAA, will turn on its ability to 
overcome data security measures, including any use of encryption, pro-
vided in a Data Trust cloud.350 
d. Foreign Intelligence Summary. — A Data Shard cloud will be subject 
to provisions of foreign intelligence surveillance law for searches of 
stored content within the territory of the United States. Its status is the 
same as any U.S.-based “electronic service provider.” In contrast, a Data 
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Localization cloud will be subject to FISA and the FAA only so long as 
there is a geographic connection with the United States. A Data 
Localization cloud accessible from the United States will likely fall under 
the applicable foreign intelligence surveillance statutes. Finally, a Data 
Trust cloud located outside the United States is not an “electronic service 
provider” under relevant statutory provisions. 
B. Extraterritorial Discovery by Private Parties 
Thus far, this Article has examined legal authorities enabling govern-
mental demands for data stored in non-U.S. clouds. There are also paths 
for requests that are made by civil litigants in the United States for such 
information. In comparison to other jurisdictions, the U.S. discovery pro-
cess is far-reaching. As the Sedona Conference explains, “U.S. discovery is 
widely considered to be the broadest and most permissive in the world.”351 
Unlike in civil law countries, discovery in the United States is not managed 
by a judge but is instead largely self-executing by parties to the litigation.352 
As Gil Keteltas observes, “[D]iscovery in U.S. litigation is a right, and key 
information must be provided to an opponent even without a request from 
the opponent.”353 
When private parties seek extraterritorial discovery, U.S. discovery 
law provides two paths: U.S. litigants can seek discovery pursuant to the 
Hague Convention or through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
Article considers each authority in turn. 
1. The Hague Convention. — The United States is a signatory to the 
Hague Evidence Convention, which provides a nonexclusive means of 
taking evidence in civil and commercial matters.354 According to the 
helpful summary of European data protection commissioners, the Hague 
Convention “provides a standard procedure for issuing ‘letters of 
request’ or ‘letters rogatory’ which are petitions from the court of one 
country to the designated central authority of another requesting assis-
tance from that authority in obtaining relevant information located 
within its borders.”355 From the perspective of U.S. litigants, however, the 
Hague Convention proves to be a ﬂawed method for gathering evidence. 
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First, not all E.U. Members are parties to the Hague Convention.356 
Second, many E.U. signatory states ﬁled reservations at the time of 
ratiﬁcation that essentially prevent its use as part of pre-trial discovery.357 
These countries include France, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands.358 
It should be noted, however, that a letters rogatory can also be submitted 
to countries outside of the Hague Convention and would be subject to 
general principles of comity.359 
a. Data Shards. — The letters rogatory process, pursuant to the 
Hague Convention, is not relevant to the Data Shard cloud. After all, 
access to information in such a cloud is provided exclusively from the 
United States. As a consequence, courts are likely to consider this infor-
mation to be located in the United States. In such cases, normal domestic 
discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will occur. 
b. Data Localization and Data Trusts. — In the case of Data Localization 
and Data Trust clouds, a letter requesting evidence will be served from a 
U.S. court to a judicial authority in the country where the cloud is 
located. Both Data Localization and Data Trust clouds can be served with 
these letters. A litigant in the United States seeking discovery might 
argue, however, that gathering evidence from the U.S. provider running 
a Data Localization cloud should not require use of the Hague 
Convention because the provider is directly subject to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This case would be bolstered if the Data Localization 
cloud was an incomplete one, as in Microsoft Ireland, where the non-U.S. 
data were also technically accessible for the cloud provider from within 
the United States.360 A different result is likely if a Data Trust 
arrangement is at stake. Here, a litigant in the United States would be 
more likely to use the Hague Convention process and to direct requests 
solely to the Data Trustee rather than to the cloud provider, who is 
restricted from accessing the data in the network. 
c. The Hague Convention Summary. — A Data Shard cloud does not 
implicate the need for use of letters rogatory. Both Data Localization and 
Data Trust clouds, in contrast, can fall under the Hague Convention. 
Moreover, a Data Trust will provide additional protection to its users; it 
insulates the cloud provider from these data requests and shifts them to 
the local, non-U.S. Data Trustee. 
2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. — The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
permit discovery of all nonprivileged information relevant to a claim or 
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defense.361 These rules define “relevancy” broadly.362 In 2006, Amendments 
to the Federal Rules included “electronically stored information” as being 
among the information covered by the “duty to disclose.”363 These amend-
ments also added an explicit balancing test that requires, among other fac-
tors, an assessment of “whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”364 
A distinction must be drawn between discovery directed against a 
party in litigation and discovery directed at a nonparty that holds data 
that may be considered relevant (a so-called third party). Generally, a 
plaintiff or defendant must comply with a discovery request for its own 
data, regardless of where the data is stored. However, U.S. law also per-
mits discovery directed at third parties. Here, the picture becomes more 
complicated, as those third parties, such as cloud providers, may be 
prohibited from disclosing data stored by their users. ECPA ﬂatly prohib-
its cloud providers from complying with civil discovery requests to dis-
close the content of data held on behalf of users. Such requests must be 
served directly on the creator of the records.365 ECPA does, however, per-
mit cloud providers to disclose customer-identifying information and 
other metadata in response to civil discovery requests.366 
As noted above, under Microsoft Ireland, the provisions of ECPA 
prohibiting disclosure of content in response to civil subpoenas do not 
apply to content stored outside the United States.367 When parties in the 
United States seek information located in a foreign country for produc-
tion as part of civil litigation, courts look to the applicable rules regard-
ing comity. The most inﬂuential test for comity in the United States is the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. The Restatement sets up 
a multipart test concerning the necessary comity analysis.368 This test 
helps to deﬁne limits of a U.S. court’s “power to order foreign discovery 
in the face of objections by foreign states.”369 When parties in the United 
States seek information located in a foreign country for production in 
civil litigation, courts invoke the ﬁve-factor comity analysis, which 
includes a balancing of the U.S. court’s interest in complying with the 
discovery request and the risk of undermining “important interests of 
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the state where the [requested] information is located.”370 Depending on 
the type of global cloud storing the information and where that infor-
mation is stored, results for discovery requests can vary drastically. 
a. Data Shards. — As seen with letters rogatory, a U.S. court is not 
likely to view a Data Shard cloud—where data is searchable from the 
United States—as involving a foreign data request. Similarly, a civil litiga-
tion request to a Data Shard provider may be treated as subject to the 
same rules as garden-variety domestic requests. If so, the normal rule of 
“relevancy” for civil discovery in the United States will apply and not a 
multifactor comity test. 
b. Data Localization and Data Trusts. — E.U. data protection law will 
be important to the comity analysis for Data Localization and Data Trust 
clouds. In cases in which such discovery requests are contested, litigants 
from E.U. Member States will typically present U.S. courts with evidence 
of the fundamental importance of data protection in their legal order.371 
Information privacy in the United States does not have a similar status 
anchored in fundamental rights, which means a U.S. court may struggle 
to understand its international relation, namely, data protection law.372 
In addition to the data protection law of the non-U.S. trustee, a Data 
Trust outside the United States is safeguarded by the relevant jurisdic-
tion’s law of trusts. Such ﬁduciary relationships, as present between T-
Systems and its Microsoft cloud customers, represent an additional, 
substantive national interest when a court carries out a comity analysis 
and assesses the balance of interests present in the matter before it. In 
such cases, a Data Trust cloud will be able to claim that a foreign 
discovery request would harm “important interests of the state.”373 
A ﬁnal issue regards the distinction between a discovery request 
made to a party to the underlying litigation and one made to a third 
party with control over that information. This distinction is important for 
international discovery requests made pursuant to subpoenas.374 The use 
of a Data Trust cloud creates additional protection from foreign discov-
ery requests beyond those of a Data Localization cloud. Information in 
such clouds is held by a party with a role more akin to a storage locker 
company than a bank holding customer records. 
c. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Summary. — Discovery requests to a 
Data Shard cloud are likely to be viewed as similar to a domestic discov-
ery request. In contrast, a U.S. court will analyze a contested request to 
Data Localization and Data Trust clouds under a comity analysis. Of these 
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two network models, Data Trust clouds are most likely to have success in 
resisting U.S. litigants’ requests for data in the cloud. Companies manag-
ing this kind of cloud will be able to demonstrate “important interests of 
the state” threatened by the foreign discovery request.375 Moreover, the 
information in such a cloud will be subject to the legal requirements of 
data protection law and domestic trust law. Under a comity analysis, a 
U.S. court would assign signiﬁcant weight to these factors against grant-
ing a discovery request to cloud data stored extraterritorially. 
III. PRINCIPLES FOR LEGAL ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL CLOUD 
This Article now revisits its four initial lessons with reference to the 
preceding analysis of existing legal authorities for extraterritorial data 
access. Its main conclusion will be that the old status quo, a unilateral 
approach primarily controlled by the United States, is breaking down. 
The Pax Americana for the internet is not what it used to be; or more pre-
cisely, the ability of the United States to go it alone concerning requests 
for extraterritorial data is diminishing. The key factors in this decline are 
the growth of the internet outside the United States, the increased trend 
toward localization of data (both legal and technical), and the inter-
national skepticism toward U.S. privacy protections. 
In place of the unilateral approach, this Article advocates for new 
international agreements regarding extraterritorial data access. These 
are to be based, ﬁrst, on a level playing ﬁeld—to meet the need for equal 
treatment of global clouds, regardless of the location of the provider’s 
headquarters. As a second principle, this Article calls for the develop-
ment of rules for data access to global clouds based on reciprocal inter-
ests among nations. To a great extent, the CLOUD Act acknowledges 
these policy concerns and breaks important new ground. 
A. Initial Lessons Revisited 
Section I.C.2 drew four preliminary lessons. The ﬁrst is that Data 
Shard, Data Localization, and Data Trust clouds raise distinct legal issues. 
A one-size-ﬁts-all analysis is not suitable for evaluating legal questions 
regarding access to information stored in these different kinds of clouds, 
and the preceding analysis of U.S. legal authorities for extraterritorial 
data access conﬁrms this point. In particular, Data Shard and Data Trust 
clouds remain at different ends of the spectrum with respect to such data 
requests. And while the CLOUD Act has largely ﬂattened the distinction 
among different types of clouds for SCA requests,376 differences in treat-
ment persist under other legal authorities. 
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Under a variety of laws, U.S. courts are likely to treat a Data Shard 
cloud in the same fashion as any garden-variety, U.S.-based cloud. As far 
as governmental data requests are concerned, for example, courts will 
reach this outcome for subpoena requests.377 Regarding discovery 
requests by private parties, courts are similarly likely to assimilate their 
analysis of Data Shard clouds to that of U.S.-based clouds.378 Over time, 
these outcomes may make Data Shard networks relatively less attractive 
for non-U.S. clients who are concerned about data access requests from 
the United States and skeptical of U.S. privacy law. This result may be 
altered, however, by the CLOUD Act—especially once the United States 
reaches executive agreements with foreign governments pursuant to the 
Act. 
The second lesson regards the divisibility of control—that is, the 
ability to separate cloud access from other aspects of network manage-
ment. This dimension is found in Data Trust clouds, which—under the 
current state of play—offer additional protections from U.S. extraterrito-
rial requests for localized cloud information. The CLOUD Act extends 
the SCA to these clouds, but access requests under the Act will be 
directed to the Data Trustee, not the cloud provider. In this fashion, the 
divisibility of control serves to equalize treatment of a U.S. provider of a 
Data Trust cloud with a non-U.S. provider of a foreign localized cloud.379 
On the civil side, requests for information in a Data Trust cloud will be 
analyzed according to a comity analysis, which is typically that of the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. Data Trustees will be able to 
draw on the protections of both their domestic information protection 
law and domestic law of trusts, resulting in strong interests against disclo-
sure of cloud data.380 
The third lesson concerns the growth of data localization, both of 
the technical and legal kind. Professors Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu have 
identiﬁed the important role of intermediaries in assisting governments 
to control internet behavior.381 In their explanation, law does not func-
tion like the Ten Commandments—that is, as “a series of direct, 
individualized directives (thou shall not kill, steal or bear false wit-
ness).”382 Rather, governments exercise extraterritorial control over the 
internet by controlling the behavior of intermediaries.383 This process is 
demonstrated by the localization requirements for global clouds. 
Through legal mandates, governments have acted to require their poten-
tial surveillance “targets” to store data domestically with regulated 
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“intermediaries,” namely cloud companies. Moreover, non-U.S. custom-
ers who do not fall under such a legal requirement may seek such ser-
vices for their own reasons, including doubts about U.S. privacy protec-
tions. The development of ready-made cloud technology that permits 
localization has lowered the costs of using Data Localization or Data 
Trust clouds. 
The fourth lesson is that policies in this area must be based on a 
dynamic analysis of the interplay between legal rules and cloud technol-
ogy. The myriad parties involved in the process include those who seek 
data, cloud customers, cloud providers, and nation-states that contem-
plate data localization laws. In response to legal and technological devel-
opments, these parties will, in turn, strategically alter their behavior. 
When it comes to extraterritorial access to data held in non-U.S. clouds, 
such strategic behavior will predictably seek out clouds that are more 
rather than less insulated from data requests originating from the United 
States. 
With these four lessons in mind, what are the big-picture takeaways? 
First, the CLOUD Act has weakened a past pattern of U.S. law, which was 
to subsume Data Shard clouds entirely within its existing rules for domes-
tic clouds. The CLOUD Act makes Data Localization and Data Shard 
clouds equally subject to SCA requests. As a consequence, certain non-
U.S. customers of networked computing may be more willing to use Data 
Shard clouds. Put differently, non-U.S. customers who are skeptical of 
U.S. law, or would prefer to have data requests for their information han-
dled under their own legal system, gain somewhat less of a beneﬁt from 
using Data Localization and Data Trust clouds. Like Data Shard clouds, 
these latter models are now also subject to U.S. SCA requests. 
Second, it is also clear that MLATs will remain important. The pro-
cess of developing executive agreements under the CLOUD Act will take 
many years; in contrast, there are now sixty countries that have MLATs 
with the United States.384 MLATs will also be of continuing importance if 
a foreign government seeks information about a U.S. person or non-U.S. 
person located in the United States. Perhaps most importantly post–
CLOUD Act, the SCA leaves unaltered the inapplicability of the SCA to a 
wide range of records that a business may have about its customers, clients, 
and users. 
Finally, the regime of Pax Americana for the internet is in decline. 
As a historical matter, the United States developed the internet and 
subsequently exercised great power over its rules.385 Due to this historical 
development, the internet’s “origin story”—as Hollywood says in super-
hero ﬁlms—led the world’s data traffic to pass through the territory of 
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the United States.386 The result was a bonanza for U.S. national security 
agencies and law enforcement. Today, however, the dominance of the 
United States over the internet is under assault in many areas of policy, 
including global access to extraterritorial data. Legal data localization is 
one of the ways that many countries are now threatening the open inter-
net. The next section considers the erosion of the Pax Americana, 
speciﬁcally as it affects extraterritorial data access. It also identiﬁes two 
core principles to guide the future of data access laws in light of the shift-
ing balance of power in global internet policy. 
B. International Cooperation and Equal Treatment of Extraterritorial Clouds 
As cloud technologies continue to evolve, the past unilateral 
approach of the United States is no longer tenable. Moving forward, the 
United States cannot expect to be the sole decisionmaker regarding the 
applicable legal process when the U.S. government or civil litigants seek 
data stored extraterritorially.387 This result follows for a number of fac-
tors, including a likely future that is one of increased Data Localization 
and Data Trust clouds, which will limit the reach of extraterritorial data 
requests. 
There has also been a dramatic growth of the internet outside the 
United States. The International Telecommunication Union estimates 
that approximately 3.2 billion people were online in 2015.388 Of these, 
approximately two billion were from developing countries.389 According 
to one estimate, fewer than ten percent of internet users are located in 
the United States.390 As the center of gravity of internet usage shifts, more 
countries will resist exclusivity status for U.S. data access rules. At the 
same time, U.S. cloud companies will continue to face data requests from 
parties outside the United States. 
In both governmental and civil litigation, foreign litigants will seek 
to shield data under a comity analysis by emphasizing the importance of 
their constitutional and statutory interests in data protection and 
privacy.391 Both civil litigation discovery and governmental data demands 
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will therefore be complicated by the constitutional status of information 
privacy in important foreign jurisdictions, most notably the European 
Union.392 Indeed, in the relevant academic literature in the United 
States, scholars have either noted a trend toward U.S. courts giving 
greater weight to foreign privacy law in their comity verdicts or argued 
that such a result is necessary.393 
Finally, in the absence of some mechanism for global data access 
rules, there is risk of a free-for-all among conﬂicting rules. Researchers at 
the Universities of London and Cambridge have raised the risk of a 
“sanctions arm race” among different legal orders.394 In evaluating a 
clash among legal rules, a cloud provider subject to the rule of multiple 
jurisdictions may have to “choose which state’s laws to break.”395 In this 
regard, the European Union may currently have the upper hand with the 
provisions in its General Data Protection Regulation, which permit 
massive ﬁnes. The penalties in the GDPR can reach up to the greater of 
twenty million euros or four percent of an enterprise’s annual worldwide 
turnover.396 
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Until recently, U.S. policymakers placed little signiﬁcance on issues 
involving access to information located outside the United States. For 
example, Swire and Hemmings observe that for many years the MLAT 
process was merely “an obscure specialty topic for international law-
yers.”397 In contrast, today, U.S. law enforcement frequently seeks the 
cooperation of foreign jurisdictions in combating terrorism and orga-
nized crime, just as foreign authorities turn to U.S. officials for assistance 
in their own such efforts.398 Access to global data greatly aids both par-
ties.399 Moreover, civil requests for discovery raise higher stakes than 
before because of the growth of global commerce and the increase in 
international communications.400 
Others have predicted an end to the unilateral approach and 
greater difficulties for U.S. parties who seek access to data in non-U.S. 
clouds. Peter Swire, a member of President Obama’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technology, has called for legal 
reform based on a judgment that “the status quo of protections is likely 
to be weakened due to localization and other effects.”401 Daskal warns of 
the threat of “a Balkanized Internet and a race to the bottom, with every 
nation unilaterally seeking to access sought-after data, companies increas-
ingly caught between conﬂicting laws, and privacy rights minimally pro-
tected, if at all.”402 
There are also indications of a growing awareness regarding the 
need for better mechanisms for access to international cloud data. In 
particular, there is an emerging E.U.–U.S. collaboration around issues 
relating to national security and law enforcement. A sign of this 
increased transatlantic cooperation is the E.U.–U.S. data protection 
Umbrella Agreement, which permits information sharing “to combat 
crime, including terrorism.”403 The Umbrella Agreement establishes data 
privacy protections for all personal data that is shared pursuant to it.404 
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Within the European Union itself, the European Commission is 
considering different options to permit speedier access to information 
stored in clouds within its Member States. These national E.U. standards 
vary widely in their levels of privacy safeguards for the users.405 
Turning to two ﬁnal policy points, this Article ﬁrst discusses the mer-
its of the policy principle of a level playing ﬁeld for tech companies. Such 
a policy would treat clouds equally regardless of whether these entities 
stored data within the United States or extraterritorially. The CLOUD 
Act has taken signiﬁcant steps in this direction. It then discusses the 
importance of building a new regime for legal access to the global cloud 
around a principle of reciprocity. The CLOUD Act has presented a way 
forward that enhances international cooperation around this concept. 
The need is to harmonize international law in a way that respects privacy 
but also preserves suitable access to data with appropriate legal process. 
1. The Level Playing Field. — The ﬁrst principle for policymakers is 
that the United States should seek international agreements that treat 
extraterritorial clouds equally regardless of the provider’s national 
origin. This Article terms this principle “the level playing ﬁeld.” 
Highlighting the need for such a principle, some jurists have discussed 
special limits on U.S. cloud providers whose networks have a non-U.S. 
component. Near the end of his concurrence in Microsoft Ireland, Judge 
Lynch raised this approach as a hypothetical issue. For Judge Lynch, 
Congress, in ﬁnding the “ideal balance” in an amended SCA, must do 
more than defer to “the mere location abroad of the server on which the 
service provider has chosen to store communications.”406 In listing a 
range of potential approaches and noting the absence of any “all-or-
nothing choice,” Judge Lynch observes that “[Congress] is free to decide, 
for example, to set different rules for access to communications stored 
abroad depending on the nationality of . . . the corporate service pro-
vider.”407 
In a related fashion, Kerr, in sketching the “next generation commu-
nications privacy act,” explores whether this statute should mandate 
technological design constraints on U.S. cloud providers.408 He writes: 
“Congress could regulate territoriality by adopting express rules as to 
when providers can or must design their networks in ways that go outside 
U.S. territory to subject communications to foreign government 
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access.”409 Ultimately, Kerr turns away from this solution and calls for a 
user-based regime for territoriality.410 He is wise to do so; it would be 
highly problematic for different U.S. legal rules to apply to an 
extraterritorial cloud based on the nationality of the provider. 
The law should not demand more of domestic companies than non-
U.S. companies in regulating requests for information in extraterritorial 
clouds. Today’s market for information technology is an international 
one, and different legal standards for domestic and nondomestic compa-
nies would simply encourage the use of non-U.S. services by non-U.S. 
customers.411 These customers would route around U.S. regulation by 
avoiding U.S. tech companies and storing their information in their 
national clouds. Current efforts by U.S. companies to demonstrate their 
“careful stewardship of private data” would be undercut.412 Looking to 
the future of digital services, Neelie Kroes, former E.U. Commissioner 
for Digital Affairs, predicted: “It is often American providers that will 
miss out, because they are often the leaders in cloud services. If 
European cloud customers cannot trust the United States government, 
then maybe they won’t trust [U.S.] cloud providers either.”413 Differing 
legal standards for U.S. companies would also prevent global specializa-
tion by cloud providers and limit the resulting beneﬁts of expertise and 
scalability of technology.414 It would also encourage balkanization of the 
internet into competing national or regional ﬁefdoms with the threat of 
future interoperability snafus on the horizon. The stakes are high; as two 
scholars note, the wrong kind of legal regime runs the risk of destroying 
the global nature of the internet.415 
As an additional policy matter, U.S. law generally does not impose 
the full United States Code on U.S. companies when they engage in busi-
ness outside this country. It permits U.S. companies that do business 
internationally to follow laws of the applicable foreign jurisdiction and 
does not limit the ability of foreign nations to regulate behavior in their 
territories.416 This policy reﬂects respect for other states, which is a bul-
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wark of international law. As Judge Lynch observed in his concurrence in 
Microsoft Ireland, U.S. demands for records about a foreign national 
stored on servers in her own country raise the possibility for “diplomatic 
strife.”417 In particular, there is a danger of “diplomatic consequences” 
from “over-extending the reach of American law enforcement offi-
cials.”418 In his reference to “consequences,” Judge Lynch was alluding to 
the power of foreign nations to make U.S. cloud companies subject to 
reciprocal claims for information of their citizens that is stored in the 
United States. As the saying goes, “what’s sauce for the goose is sauce for 
the gander.” Or, as Swire and Hemmings warn, “[a]t least for the near 
future, the United States is a primary exporter of electronic evidence.”419 
In similar terms, Richard Salgado, the Director for Law Enforcement and 
Information Security at Google, explained to a congressional committee 
that since 2009, Google has received more requests from foreign legal 
authorities than from U.S. criminal law enforcement agencies.420 
To be sure, there are circumstances in which U.S. lawmakers regu-
late behavior by U.S. actors that takes place outside this country. The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) provides a useful comparison.421 
This 1977 statute prohibits corporate bribery of foreign officials; it does 
so because this behavior has a deeply destructive impact on the fair mar-
ket system, both overseas and within the United States.422 Entities that 
engage in such banned corrupt practices act unfairly. The unfairness is, 
ﬁrst, to those U.S. companies that do not wish to violate foreign law by 
bribing officials and, second, to U.S. investors, who face uncertainty in 
making investment decisions due to the lack of accounting transparency 
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that typically accompanies corrupt practices.423 In comparison to the 
FCPA, a restriction on U.S. cloud service providers abroad does not deter 
negative externalities. The FCPA prevents a bad act: bribery abroad. The 
existence of a cloud service is not inherently a bad act, although it is 
possible that someone might engage in a bad act using a cloud service. In 
short, the FCPA is not an apt model for regulation of extraterritorial 
access to data held in a cloud. 
U.S. tech companies’ leadership in the global cloud market has been 
a positive marketplace factor due to the efficiencies of large-scale cloud 
computing. Moreover, the cloud services of U.S. companies are based on 
a business model built around compliance with foreign jurisdictions. In 
fact, some of the open questions under the SCA pre–CLOUD Act 
followed from U.S. tech companies trying to comply with aspects of the 
law of foreign jurisdictions regarding extraterritorial data requests that 
are in tension with U.S. law.424 The critical need is for policy reform that 
promotes a global and interoperable internet, safeguards privacy, and 
permits reasonable access to cloud data for law enforcement and civil 
litigants. 
As has been discussed above, the CLOUD Act takes a major step 
toward leveling the playing ﬁeld for SCA data requests. Speciﬁcally, it 
makes Data Localization and Data Shard clouds equally subject to the 
SCA requests. The statute also treats Data Trust clouds on the same foot-
ing as Data Localizations in a comity analysis while preventing a disfavor-
ing of U.S. cloud providers who set up such arrangements in foreign 
countries.425 The law’s impact on privacy is a thornier question, however, 
and this Article turns to it below. 
2. The Principle of Reciprocity. — The second and final point of orienta-
tion for policy reform should be the recognition of reciprocal national 
interests concerning legal access to the global cloud. There is a need to 
develop new agreements to regulate extraterritorial data access. The U.S. 
Congress has now taken a decisive step toward the principle of 
reciprocity in enacting the CLOUD Act. This Article has already dis-
cussed this statute in the context of the SCA; it now examines it in the 
larger context of foreign requests for data in U.S. clouds.426 After sketch-
ing the CLOUD Act’s advancement of reciprocity, this Article develops 
three critical points. First, the merit of the agreements developed under 
the CLOUD Act depends on how well the executive branch and Congress 
use the Act’s processes to monitor the compliance of other nations with 
resulting agreements. Second, the Act should be improved through 
amendment. Finally, the CLOUD Act creates strong incentives for cloud 
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providers to know who their users are. It encourages a new know-your-
customer regime for the global cloud. 
a. Reciprocity. — The CLOUD Act has already amended the SCA to 
extend U.S. government requests to reach data stored extraterritorially. 
Step One took effect immediately with enactment of the statute.427 Look-
ing to the future, however, the CLOUD Act opens up a new way for for-
eign governments to access data stored in the United States, including 
real-time data requests. These accords require reciprocity; the foreign 
government must grant the United States similar treatment. Step Two is 
not yet effective; it requires development of “executive agreements” with 
“qualifying foreign government[s].”428 Once in place, such agreements 
will allow a foreign country to bypass the MLAT process and make 
requests directly to a U.S. cloud provider, but only for law enforcement 
purposes regarding “serious crime.”429 
To understand how this law approaches reciprocity, we begin with its 
central statutory term of art, the “qualifying foreign government.” The 
deﬁnition of a “qualifying foreign government” has two essential ele-
ments. First, and as a threshold matter, the laws of the foreign jurisdic-
tion can be qualifying only if they supply providers with “substantive and 
procedural opportunities” similar to those provided by the CLOUD 
Act.430 These include, in particular, the abilities of the provider to seek to 
“quash or modify” legal requests for content of communications based 
on a conﬂict of laws, and to disclose to the foreign government the legal 
request for the disclosure of communication.431 These are important safe-
guards for transparency. 
Second, a qualifying foreign government is one with which the 
United States has entered into “an executive agreement.”432 The CLOUD 
Act establishes the necessary elements of such an agreement in great 
detail. The executive branch of the United States is to develop the agree-
ment with the foreign government in question.433 The Attorney General 
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must then certify it to Congress.434 In making this certiﬁcation, the 
Attorney General is to evaluate the domestic law of the foreign govern-
ment and ﬁnd that it “affords robust substantive and procedural protec-
tions for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data collection and 
activities of the foreign government that will be subject to the agree-
ment.”435 The CLOUD Act then spells out a detailed list of factors to be 
used in making this determination, including whether the foreign 
government “adheres to applicable international human rights obliga-
tions and commitments or demonstrates respect for international univer-
sal human rights.”436 The CLOUD Act also sets requirements for each 
data request by the qualifying foreign government. The request must be 
particularized, based on “articulable and credible facts,” and subject to 
“review or oversight by a court, judge, magistrate, or other independent 
authority” in the foreign jurisdiction.437 
As international agreements under the CLOUD Act begin to follow 
the policy principle of reciprocity, the key question will be the nationality 
of the data. The United States will now begin the process of constructing 
a series of international agreements about access to global data by 
proceeding ﬁrst with states that most closely share its values. As an initial 
attempt in this regard, one can point to the proposed U.S.–U.K. Bilateral 
Agreement on Data Access, which would permit “reciprocal targeted 
access to data, enabling companies based in one country to comply with 
lawful orders from the other.”438 
In sum, the CLOUD Act takes a dramatic step toward a global 
interoperable system that will expedite law enforcement’s data requests. 
A similar process is happening within the European Union itself. In April 
2018, the Commission proposed a new “e-evidence” regulation to create 
the “European Production Order.”439 This regulation would allow a judi-
cial authority in one E.U. Member State to obtain orders for electronic 
evidence.440 It would also permit a judicial authority in one E.U. Member 
State to obtain electronic evidence directly from a service provider in 
another state.441 The proposed regulation would be an initial move to a 
CLOUD Act for the European Union itself. Talks are also underway 
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between the United States and the European Union regarding a possible 
E.U.–U.S. general framework under the CLOUD Act.442 
b. Evaluating the CLOUD Act. — The decentralized approach of the 
CLOUD Act is promising. There are too many variations in this area of 
law within the international landscape and across different legal and 
political systems for any single treaty or statute to control. Indeed, Woods 
makes an important point in this regard about the danger that such a 
single-world agreement could be based only on the least common denomi-
nator.443 Outside the United States, countries have differing standards with 
respect to privacy and due process rights when it comes to accessing 
stored digital data. From this perspective, decentralization is a compel-
ling second-best solution. 
On a positive note, there are important elements of the CLOUD Act 
that protect privacy. First, regarding U.S. citizens and residents, the 
CLOUD Act’s executive agreements permit foreign government requests 
concerning the data only of non-U.S. persons who are located outside 
the United States.444 Accessing the data of U.S. persons and others 
located in the United States will still require use of the MLAT process. 
There are additional safeguards to prevent a foreign government from 
targeting a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person in the United States. For 
instance, the statute forbids an action sometimes called “authority-hop-
ping”; this term refers to a practice in which one nation engages in 
surveillance and shares the resulting data with a second nation, one 
whose own law prevents it from engaging in this action.445 The law also 
requires a recertiﬁcation process after ﬁve years;446 in this fashion, the 
CLOUD Act creates an opening for pressure when shortcomings appear 
in a foreign country’s use of speciﬁc executive agreements. 
As another positive step, the CLOUD Act forbids executive agree-
ments from requiring a company to be capable of decrypting data.447 
This aspect of the law is perhaps surprising in light of the ongoing law 
enforcement concerns about going dark.448 The CLOUD Act takes this 
matter off the table for executive agreements. Speciﬁcally, it protects a 
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cloud provider under a Data Trust arrangement from being compelled to 
hack its own encrypted servers. It helps guarantee that resulting data 
requests will instead be made to the Data Trustee, who holds the keys to 
the encrypted data. 
There is much, however, that is open concerning the ultimate 
impact of the CLOUD Act. In the abstract and at this juncture, it is diffi-
cult to evaluate the merits of future agreements developed under the 
CLOUD Act.449 A key factor will be how well the executive branch and 
Congress use the statute’s mandated processes and how they approach 
undeﬁned or broadly deﬁned terms in the statute. Moreover, as a price of 
entry, the statute requires a foreign country to have or to adopt U.S.-style 
privacy safeguards in its domestic laws.450 Human rights advocates have 
found much to criticize in the law’s standards in this regard.451 Others are 
more optimistic about how the law will function.452 
Regarding the process, the CLOUD Act details a number of substan-
tive requirements that the Attorney General must accomplish before certi-
fying that an executive agreement meets the statute’s requirements. Thus, 
the Attorney General must obtain “the concurrence of the Secretary of 
State” and take into account “credible information and expert input.”453 
Another requirement concerns the signiﬁcant oversight role of 
Congress. During a 180-day period, the legislature can disapprove the 
                                                                                                                           
 449. At present, whether the CLOUD Act will lead to an increase or decrease in global 
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 451. See, e.g., Robyn Greene, Somewhat Improved, the CLOUD Act Still Poses a 
Threat to Privacy and Human Rights, Just Security (Mar. 23, 2018), https:// 
www.justsecurity.org/54242/improved-cloud-act-poses-threat-privacy-human-rights/ [https:// 
perma.cc/92G5-GA2S]. 
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Privacy and Human Rights, Lawfare (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-
cloud-act-good-privacy-and-human-rights [https://perma.cc/3BQY-MUSH]. 
 453. H.R. 1625 div. V, § 105(a) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b), (b)(1)(A)). 
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certiﬁed executive agreement by joint resolution.454 Depending on one’s 
feelings about increased legislative scrutiny, it might be desirable to 
require that Congress affirmatively approve agreements rather than rely 
only on its weaker power to issue joint resolutions of disapproval of 
executive agreements.455 The present approach means that only a veto-
proof majority in Congress can overturn a President’s decision to 
approve an executive agreement. On the other hand, giving greater 
power to Congress may slow the process of reaching executive agree-
ments and even hinder the President’s ability to effectively negotiate with 
foreign governments. 
As a further open matter under the statute, one of the statute’s most 
critical terms lacks a deﬁnition. The CLOUD Act provides that a foreign 
government can issue an order to a provider only for a “serious crime,” 
but lacks speciﬁcity as to which offenses are covered.456 An amendment 
to this statute should deﬁne the concept of “serious crime” more 
precisely.457 
Finally, there is the matter of the most expansive element of the 
CLOUD Act, which makes its real-time access to communications subject 
to its executive agreements.458 It permits service providers operating in 
the United States to carry out real-time interceptions in this country in 
compliance with orders issued by foreign governments.459 In so doing, it 
goes beyond the reach of the SCA, which concerns only stored data.460 
While imposing some limits on the type of foreign interception orders 
that U.S. providers can comply with, the CLOUD Act does not require 
foreign law enforcement agencies seeking real-time access to meet the 
tough warrant standards found in the U.S. Wiretap Act.461 
                                                                                                                           
 454. Id. (adding 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(4), titled “Congressional Review”). 
 455. See id.; see also Jennifer Daskal & Peter Swire, Suggestions for Implementing the 
Cloud Act, Lawfare (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/suggestions-implementing-
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 456. H.R. 1625 div. V, § 105(a) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(i)). 
 457. See Daniel Sepulveda, Opinion, Bill on Cross-Border Data Access Needs to 
Change, Despite Laudable Goal, Hill (Mar. 16, 2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/ 
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 459. Id. 
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the other hand, the Wiretap Act requires much more rigorous justifications for real-time 
interception warrants, also commonly known as “super warrants.” Requirements include, 
for example, “full and complete statement[s]” as to why an order should be issued and 
“whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518 (2012). 
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If the U.S. government obtains reciprocity from foreign govern-
ments, as is required by the CLOUD Act, the foreign government must 
amend its law so that it does not block providers from carrying out real-
time interceptions in that country on behalf of a U.S. governmental 
entity.462 This aspect of the CLOUD Act raises numerous policy questions 
about a subject—the interception of real-time data—that U.S. law has 
accorded its highest privacy protections since the enactment of the 
Wiretap Act in 1968.463 In particular, it imports a “targeting” concept 
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act into wiretap law.464 As a 
result, incidental collection of data about U.S. persons becomes likely. 
Collection of real-time communications data about a British person in 
the United States, for example, will also sweep in information about U.S. 
persons with whom the British person communicated. 
Moreover, the CLOUD Act’s “minimization” requirement for such 
data is much lower than the Wiretap Act’s concept of minimization. For 
the CLOUD Act, minimization applies only to information affirmatively 
found not to be “relevant to the prevention, detection, investigation, or 
prosecution of serious crime.”465 Put in more straightforward terms, the 
CLOUD Act’s requirement of a ﬁnding of “not . . . relevant” permits 
information to be collected unless it can be said to be irrelevant to the 
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of serious crime.466 
At a minimum, these dramatic policy developments deserved greater 
policy scrutiny rather than being buried in a nearly thousand-page 
budget bill.467 A comparison with the European Union’s GDPR and the 
E.U.–U.S. Privacy Shield is useful. The GDPR is the main touchstone for 
E.U.-wide information privacy; among its requirements is the presence 
of “adequate” privacy protections in any non-E.U. country that receives 
personal data from the European Union.468 In reaction to the GDPR, the 
United States and the European Union have negotiated a Privacy Shield 
agreement, which allows U.S. companies to voluntarily self-certify their 
compliance with a set of E.U.-friendly fair information practices.469 
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Companies that agree to follow the Privacy Shield are deemed to have 
“adequate” data protection for the European Union; international data 
transfers can ﬂow from the European Union to these companies.470 The 
result is that the United States and European Union have created a 
normative infrastructure for bringing E.U.-style privacy practices into the 
United States.471 Over three thousand U.S. companies have entered the 
Privacy Shield.472 
In a similar fashion, the CLOUD Act starts the process of developing 
global standards under which law enforcement agencies can seek infor-
mation from cloud providers throughout the world. There is, however, a 
likely collision ahead with the substantive standards of the GDPR. In its 
Article 48, the GDPR establishes a legal regime for a situation in which 
E.U. law does not otherwise permit a data transfer but a court or adminis-
trative authority in a third country would require it.473 Such a transfer is 
permissible, however, only “if based on an international agreement, such 
as a mutual legal assistance treaty.”474 
Understanding the interaction between Article 48 of the GDPR and 
the CLOUD Act requires an analysis of the latter’s Step One and Step 
Two.475 First, the CLOUD Act extends the SCA extraterritorially. Second, 
the CLOUD Act permits the creation of executive agreements with for-
eign countries. 
Regarding the SCA, a request by U.S. law enforcement to a foreign 
provider is merely a U.S. legislative decision. Article 48 of the GDPR 
clearly requires more than that: an international agreement.476 Moreover, 
a law enforcement request under the CLOUD Act likely cannot be shoe-
horned into any GDPR exception that would allow an international data 
transfer without such an agreement.477 Finally, the Privacy Shield is 
                                                                                                                           
 470. For a discussion of the Privacy Shield, see Solove & Schwartz, Information Privacy 
Law, supra note 35, at 1187–97. 
 471. Schwartz & Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy, supra note 2, at 174–78. 
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The matter is one of some complexity. To be sure, GDPR Article 49(1)(e) does permit a 
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insufficient as a mechanism to permit a cloud provider subject to E.U. 
data protection law to respond to an SCA warrant. U.S. law enforcement 
agencies are not Privacy Shield entities.478 
Hence, from the European Union perspective, the CLOUD Act 
requires a new arrangement with the Commission for SCA requests to be 
permissible. In fact, E.U. Justice Commissioner Vera Jourova has criti-
cized the enactment of the CLOUD Act “in a fast-track procedure” and 
denounced this unilateral act by the United States as one that “narrows 
the room for [a] potential compatible solution between” the European 
Union and the United States.479 Without conceding these points, the U.S. 
Department of Justice has already met with the E.U. Commission to dis-
cuss the development of an E.U.–U.S. agreement to permit reciprocal 
exchange of data between law enforcement authorities.480 
As for the second area of necessary analysis, the SCA’s executive 
agreements would be “an international agreement” under Article 48.481 
This provision of the GDPR explicitly permits accords not only between 
the Union and a third country but also between an E.U. Member State and 
a third country, in this case the United States.482 Hence, a bilateral accord 
under the CLOUD Act would comport with the GDPR’s Article 48. 
Yet, such two-party agreements will not represent the ﬁnal word 
regarding whether the CLOUD Act is consistent with E.U. data protec-
tion law. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will ulti-
mately decide on the sufficiency of any executive agreements developed 
under the CLOUD Act. In a series of important decisions, the CJEU has 
constitutionalized E.U. data protection law as well as the overarching 
“adequacy” standard for transfers to third countries.483 In its Schrems deci-
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sion, the CJEU declared that adequacy of data privacy, as a standard for 
international transfers, means that protections must be “essentially 
equivalent.”484 As Christopher Kuner perceptively observes, the Schrems 
opinion connects the requirement of adequacy “to the level of protec-
tion required by the Charter.”485 He adds, “By deﬁning the standard that 
third countries must meet to be declared ‘adequate’ as that of essential 
equivalence with E.U. law, the CJEU has set the global data protection 
bar at a high level.”486 Thus, the CLOUD Act conﬂicts with E.U. data 
protection. 
There are also high levels of interest in both the United States and 
the European Union in working together to combat international terror-
ism and organized criminality. Both political systems are already 
collaborating in this area, and the European Union is working to put in 
place its own internal equivalent of the CLOUD Act. On April 17, 2018, it 
introduced a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Production and 
Preservation Orders for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters.487 
Unlike the CLOUD Act, however, these orders would not permit 
surveillance of real-time data, but only the preservation of stored data.488 
These E.U.-wide proposals indicate a possible common meeting 
ground for international data sharing. It is clear, moreover, that the 
European Union prefers a direct agreement with the United States rather 
than individual agreements between Member States and the United States. 
From the viewpoint of the Commission, then, the actual content of the 
CLOUD Act may pose less of a concern than the possibility that the United 
States might act unilaterally to seek nation-by-nation agreements that 
would cut the European Union itself out of the debate. As a ﬁnal twist, 
however, the CLOUD Act itself looks to conformity with international 
human rights as one factor for the permissibility of an executive 
agreement with a foreign country.489 In this light, it is notable that the 
European Court of Human Rights is now deciding a case concerning the 
U.K. intelligence community’s collection of bulk data.490 A ruling against 
the United Kingdom would be a factor against the United States coming 
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to an executive agreement with the United Kingdom under the CLOUD 
Act’s own terms. 
c. Know-Your-Customer in the Cloud. — A last point should be made 
regarding a “grand bargain” inherent in the CLOUD Act. We can break 
down this grand bargain into two parts. Part One is simply stated: The 
executive agreements under the Act focus on the nationality or location 
of the user, and therefore make the locus of data storage far less 
important. The result is that the CLOUD Act reduces the signiﬁcance of 
data localization in data access requests. This outcome maps with a 
signiﬁcant goal identiﬁed by President Obama’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies in 2013, which identi-
ﬁed a policy need for “a globally interoperable, open, and secure 
Internet architecture,” as opposed to one that increasingly requires “serv-
ers to be physically located within a country or limits on transferring data 
across borders.”491 This ﬁrst step will delight the advocates of an open 
and interoperable internet. 
A grand bargain typically has two sides, however, and the other part 
of the CLOUD Act is to incentivize cloud providers to take greater steps 
to identify their customers.492 Hence, Part Two will undoubtedly dismay 
privacy advocates. Under this law, the nationality and location of the user 
become paramount issues. The ability of a foreign country to object to 
the extraterritorial use of an SCA warrant is present only when the cloud 
provider can reasonably point to the nationality and location of the user.493 Data 
Shard and Data Localization clouds gain the beneﬁt of having their non-
U.S. customers receive additional protection under an executive agree-
ment. Even Data Localization clouds with data accessible in the United 
States beneﬁt if the location of the data user was in a foreign country 
with an executive agreement. But cloud providers would need to docu-
ment the nationality of their customers and their location to beneﬁt from 
the executive agreements that will be developed under the CLOUD Act. 
As illustrated by Microsoft Ireland, however, cloud providers do not 
currently verify customer identity in any rigorous manner. The system is 
loose especially when it comes to free services, such as email, in which 
there is no need to collect billing information. Thus, in Microsoft Ireland, 
the customer who used the contested Hotmail account had merely self-
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identiﬁed as being associated with Ireland.494 As the Second Circuit 
stated, Microsoft relied on this information in storing information relat-
ing to his account in Dublin, Ireland. The court observed: “[Microsoft] 
does not verify user identity or location; it simply takes the user-provided 
information at face value, and its systems migrate the data according to 
company protocol.”495 In his concurrence, Judge Lynch termed this 
approach “self-reporting” by customers.496 
Under the CLOUD Act, the era of such self-reporting of customer 
location and identity is likely to end. The CLOUD Act asks providers 
where their clients are located and who these persons are—that is, what 
their nationality is.497 Providers are likely to translate these legal rules 
into a corporate compliance structure.498 The resulting rationalized pro-
cess, driven by in-house lawyers, will seek to answer these questions 
regarding location and identity in a quest for legal certainty and, hence, 
lowered risk. 
The GDPR is likely to have a similar policy inﬂuence.499 In Europe, 
this move to know-your-customer is being made, ironically enough, in the 
name of privacy and security. The GDPR intends to create greater obliga-
tions for cloud companies vis-à-vis their customers and, as a step toward 
that goal, is requiring detailed contracts between these parties. The key 
provisions in this regard are found in Article 28(3) of the GDPR.500 The 
mandated contracts are only possible, however, when both parties have 
detailed information about each other, which means that cloud providers 
will know more about their customers than under the old legal regime, 
one that was governed by the European Union’s Privacy Directive of 
1995.501 
Whether promoted by the European Union’s GDPR or the United 
States’ CLOUD Act, global cloud companies face a know-your-customer 
future. This step will move cloud providers closer to a paradigm already 
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present for U.S. banks, which are subject to strict laws and rules requiring 
them to identify as well as monitor their customers.502 Instead of relative 
anonymity in using cloud services, cloud providers will collect identiﬁca-
tion information about customers. The next move, in the future, might 
be a requirement to look for “red ﬂags” of suspicious activities. Such 
scrutiny is now mandated for a broad range of ﬁnancial institutions 
under federal banking regulations in the United States.503 
The impact of this know-your-customer step will spill over into civil 
litigation. As this Article has shown, when faced with extraterritorial data 
requests, cloud networks currently can argue that they are not like banks, 
some of whom have been ordered to comply with such data demands. 
Today, a non-U.S. cloud network located entirely outside the United 
States might plausibly liken itself to a storage facility in another country. 
To the extent, however, that clouds begin to function like banks by 
collecting detailed identiﬁcation information from their customers, more 
courts may order compliance with discovery requests under a comity 
analysis. 
Beyond banking and cloud computing, large internet platform com-
panies are voluntarily adopting a know-your-customer approach to make 
political discourse more transparent. Both Google and Facebook intro-
duced new rules in spring 2018 that require veriﬁcation of identity 
before allowing anyone to run ads on political issues (Facebook)504 or 
purchase election ads in the United States (Google).505 Preservation of 
the global internet is now encouraging a broad range of steps that 
reduce user anonymity. As for the CLOUD Act, it acts to preserve the 
internet as a global space, but does so at the cost of greater collection of 
customer identiﬁcation information by cloud providers. Different parties 
will evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of this approach differently. 
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CONCLUSION 
All clouds are not created equal, and different networks dictate dis-
tinct outcomes for actual cases involving data access requests. This Article 
has presented three models of cloud computing: the Data Shard, Data 
Localization, and Data Trust clouds. This new typology reveals how the 
same legal authority leads to notably different results in data access cases 
depending on the technical architecture of the cloud network. In order 
to treat global clouds accurately and fairly, U.S. courts must take these 
disparities in technology into account when judging actual cases. 
There is also an important international consequence following 
from use of these different cloud technologies. The writing is on the wall; 
the rest of the world can and will shift to cloud models that shelter its 
data beyond the exclusive reach of U.S. law. Cloud technologies now pro-
vide a way to route around law. The availability of Data Localization 
clouds as well as Data Trust clouds demonstrate that companies and indi-
viduals outside of the United States have multiple ways to shelter their 
data beyond the exclusive reach of U.S. law. This analysis points to the 
grounds for a breakdown in the current Pax Americana for data access 
rules. This trend spells the end of unilateral decisionmaking by U.S. 
courts concerning the legal process to be applied when the government 
or civil litigants seek data stored extraterritorially. 
There is a need for new principles in a world of omnipresent global 
cloud computing. This Article has identiﬁed two such concepts. First, a 
new cloud access regime should treat extraterritorial clouds equally, 
regardless of where the cloud provider has its headquarters. Among the 
many reasons for doing so is to prevent a balkanization of the internet, 
which risks future interoperability snafus and other problems. Second, 
the legal system should develop new international agreements for legal 
access to the global cloud based on a concept of reciprocity among 
nations. An insistence by U.S. policymakers on exclusivity for U.S. legal 
access rules will be counterproductive: It will drive foreign customers to 
Data Localization and Data Trust clouds, which will only increase the 
relevancy of the law of foreign jurisdictions, limit the access of govern-
ment and litigants in the United States to global cloud data, and harm 
U.S. tech companies. 
As a second and ﬁnal point, the CLOUD Act of 2018 takes a major 
step toward incorporation of these principles. Regarding “the level play-
ing ﬁeld,” this statute largely reduces differences in the law’s treatment of 
clouds based on the nationality of the cloud provider or the location of 
the stored data. Regarding reciprocity, the CLOUD Act has important 
provisions in this regard. It opens up a new way for foreign governments 
to access provider data stored in the United States if the foreign state per-
mits the United States the same access rights on its own soil. Currently, 
much about the required executive agreements is uncertain; there are no 
such accords at present. One result is already foreseeable, however, and it 
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is the encouragement of a know-your-customer global regime for the 
internet. The CLOUD Act creates powerful incentives for cloud provid-
ers to be able to document the nationality and location of their users. In 
return, the location of their own servers becomes less important, which 
beneﬁts the maintenance or creation of global data networks and pro-
motes an open internet. Yet, the ultimate cost may be one paid in privacy. 
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APPENDIX: CLOUD MODELS AND LEGAL AUTHORITIES—A SUMMARY 
Legal Authority Data Shard Model Data Localization Model Data Trust Model 
Fourth Amendment 506 
Information acquisition by 
the government in the U.S. 
is likely to be considered a 
Fourth Amendment search. 
If the search or seizure 
occurs outside the U.S., 
only U.S. customers of Data 
Shard services will receive 
Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. 
Constitutional protections 
do not apply to searches of 
property owned by a 
nonresident alien that is 
held in a foreign country. 
However, if the Verdugo-
Urquidez test is met, Fourth 
Amendment protections 
apply for information 
searched outside the U.S. 
Constitutional protec-
tions do not apply to 
searches of property 
owned by a nonresident 
alien that is held in a 
foreign country. Howev-
er, if the Verdugo-Urquidez 
test is met, Fourth 
Amendment protections 
apply for information 
searched outside the U.S. 
Stored 
Communications Act 507 
The SCA can compel a 
request for information 
stored extraterritorially but 
accessed within the U.S. 
The CLOUD Act creates a 
“qualifying foreign gov-
ernment” provision; the 
provider can refuse requests 
for data of a non-U.S. per-
son if it would violate for-
eign law. 
The CLOUD Act extends 
the SCA to information 
outside the U.S. The pro-
vider can move to quash. 
The CLOUD Act creates 
two new provisions: (1) gen-
eral comity analysis, and (2) 
“qualifying foreign govern-
ment.”  
Data Trusts are likely to 
have greater insulation 
from extraterritorial use 
of the SCA post–CLOUD 
Act. Data Trustees, not 
cloud providers, will 
handle requests for cus-
tomer data. One key 
issue is the “possession, 
custody, or control” lan-
guage in the CLOUD 
Act. 
MLATs 508 
The MLAT process is irrele-
vant for a Data Shard cloud 
if a court rules that the 
locus of the search of this 
cloud is domestic in nature. 
Assuming that a court de-
cides that access to cloud 
data occurs extraterritori-
ally, as Microsoft Ireland did, 
the MLAT process would 
proceed under the specific 
national and regional 
agreements that are appli-
cable.  
An MLAT process for a 
Data Trust cloud would 
be directed to the Data 
Trustee, not the cloud 
provider. Requests would 
be judged by the law of 
the Data Trustee’s local 
jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                           
 506. See supra section II.A.1. 
 507. See supra section II.A.2. 
 508. See supra section II.A.3. 
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Legal Authority Data Shard Model Data Localization Model Data Trust Model 
Administrative or 
Grand Jury  
Subpoenas 509 
If a Data Shard cloud is 
accessed within the U.S., 
the SCA will apply and bar 
use of a subpoena. If the 
cloud is accessed from out-
side the U.S., the SCA will 
not apply and subpoenas 
will be permitted.  
In Microsoft Ireland, the 
Second Circuit indicated in 
dicta that it did not think 
that a subpoena should be 
used to order access to 
information in a Data Lo-
calization cloud when held 
outside the U.S. by a party 
who is “merely a caretaker 
for another individual.”  
Data Trusts will likely 
enjoy greater protection 
from subpoena requests 
because the ability to 
access information in the 
network is separate from 
other aspects of manag-
ing the data. 
Foreign Surveillance 510 
If a Data Shard cloud is 
accessed within the U.S., it 
will be subject to provisions 
of FISA and the FAA regard-
ing searches of stored con-
tent in the U.S. A Data 
Shard provider will be sub-
ject to the same require-
ments as any other “elec-
tronic service provider” 
under these statutes. 
A Data Localization cloud 
whose content can be ac-
cessed from the U.S. likely 
falls under FISA. There is, 
however, no released FISC 
opinion regarding this pre-
cise issue. 
U.S. intelligence will be 
unlikely to be able to 
compel cooperation 
from a non-U.S. Data 
Trust cloud under the 
FAA. Pursuant to Execu-
tive Order 12,333, U.S. 
intelligence may surveil 
information stored elec-
tronically. An “arms race” 
may follow with encryp-
tion of Data Trust clouds 
as a key issue. 
Hague Convention 511  
The letters rogatory pro-
cess, pursuant to the Hague 
Convention, is not relevant 
to the Data Shard cloud 
because access to infor-
mation in such a cloud is 
exclusively from the U.S. 
Normal domestic discovery 
will be controlled by the 
Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Hague Convention is 
implicated by a Data Locali-
zation cloud. A letter 
requesting evidence will be 
served from a U.S. court to 
a judicial authority in the 
country where the cloud is 
located. 
A Data Trust provides 
additional protection to 
its users; it insulates the 
cloud provider from 
these data requests and 
shifts them to the local, 
non-U.S. Data Trustee. A 
letter requesting evi-
dence will be served from 
a U.S. court to a judicial 
authority in the country 
where the cloud is 
located.  
                                                                                                                           
 509. See supra section II.A.4. 
 510. See supra section II.A.5. 
 511. See supra section II.B.1. 
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Legal Authority Data Shard Model Data Localization Model Data Trust Model 
Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure512 
If the Data Shard cloud is 
deemed to be accessed in 
the U.S., a civil litigation 
request to a Data Shard 
provider may be treated as 
subject to the same rules as 
standard domestic requests.  
Non-U.S. data protection 
law will be important to the 
comity analysis for a Data 
Localization cloud. 
Non-U.S. data protection 
law will be important to 
the comity analysis for a 
Data Trust cloud. This 
type of cloud may fare 
better under a comity 
analysis than a Data Lo-
calization cloud. A for-
eign Data Trustee could 
point to an “important 
interest of the state” in a 
foreign discovery request. 
 
GLOSSARY 
Data Shard Model: A company stores information in the cloud in multi-
ple international locations; the network itself dynamically distributes data 
to domestic and international servers. 
 
Data Localization Model: A company stores information in a cloud that is 
restricted to a single country or region. 
 
Data Trust Model: A company bifurcates network management (con-
trolled by the Data Manager) from the ability to access data (exclusively 
held by the Data Trustee). 
                                                                                                                           
 512. See supra section II.B.2. 
